

Capítulo A 5: COOPERACIÓN TRANSFRONTERIZA EN LAS FRONTERAS EXTERIORES DE LA UE Y MÁS ALLÁ

LÍNEAS GENERALES:

Hay países que, por unas u otras razones, no están en la Unión Europea pero participan en los Programas Operativos (PP.OO.) de Cooperación Territorial —los miembros del **Espacio Económico Europeo** (EEE)—. Otros participan en los **Programas Operativos de la Política de Buena Vecindad** (ENP en sus siglas en inglés) o en los del **Instrumento de Pre-Adhesión** (IPA). En otros casos sólo existen acuerdos bilaterales y una incipiente cooperación. Algunos asuntos específicos de estas fronteras tienen que ver con la seguridad, la política de visados, etc.

PUNTOS CLAVE:

- Países europeos no miembros de la UE que participan en distintos programas de CTF.
- Instrumentos para la CTF en las fronteras exteriores de la UE y con los países candidatos a la adhesión a las CC.EE.: Phare CBC, Phare Credo, Tacis CBC, CARDS, MEDA, LACE, ENPI 2007-2013, ENI 2014-2020, IPA CBC
- Eastern Partnership
- European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
- European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)
- Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA)
- Europeas de CTF en las Fronteras Exteriores de la UE y más allá
- The role of Local and Regional Authorities
- Seguridad y cooperación en las fronteras exteriores de la UE

EJEMPLOS:

- ...
- ...



La **Confederación Helvética (Suiza)**, neutral desde su expansión¹ en 1515, siempre ha evitado cualquier alianza que pudiera implicar acción militar, política o económica. Sólo en 2002 se convirtió en miembro pleno de las Naciones Unidas, aunque fue el primer Estado que se adhirió mediante referéndum. Mantiene relaciones diplomáticas con casi todas las naciones e históricamente ha actuado como intermediario entre otros Estados.

No es miembro de la UE, ya que la población suiza ha rechazado la adhesión desde principios de los años noventa. Sus relaciones con la UE están regidas por un conjunto de tratados bilaterales y es miembro del Espacio Schengen desde 2005; aunque un referéndum para limitar la inmigración abrió el 9 de febrero de 2014 una importante brecha en la estrecha relación de Suiza con la UE. Una escasa mayoría (50,3%) de suizos decidieron imponer cuotas de entrada a los vecinos europeos y acabar con la libre circulación de personas que rige desde 2002. Este voto fue impulsado por el Partido Popular Suizo (SVP) y obliga al Gobierno Federal de Berna a poner en marcha en los próximos años una ley reguladora de la inmigración, también desde la UE. El partido euroescéptico alemán Alternativa para Alemania (AfD) sugiere este modelo para Alemania, y otros partidos de similar ideología han tomado buena nota en Dinamarca, Finlandia, Francia, los Países Bajos o Suecia.

Varios cantones suizos han sido pioneros en la historia de la CTF europea, habiendo participado en algunas de las primeras estructuras, como la Conferencia del Lago Constanza — *Bodenseekonferenz*— (AT/ CH/DE/LI) y la Comunidad de Trabajo de los Alpes (AT/CH/DE/IT), fundadas en 1972, el Espacio Franco-Valdo-Ginebrino (CH/FR) de 1973 o la *Oberreinkonferenz* —la Conferencia del Alto Rin— (CH-DE-FR) de 1975.



El **Reino de Noruega** participa en el Espacio de Integración Económico Europeo y en Schengen. Fue miembro fundador de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN).

(...)



Iceland became in 1994 part of the European Economic Area, which further diversified the economy into sectors such as finance, biotechnology, and manufacturing.

Iceland is a member of the UN, NATO, EFTA, Council of Europe and OECD, maintains diplomatic and commercial relations with practically all nations, but its ties with the Nordic countries, Germany, the United States, Canada and the other NATO nations are particularly close. Historically, due to cultural, economic and linguistic similarities, Iceland is a Nordic country, and it participates in intergovernmental cooperation through the Nordic Council.

Iceland is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), which allows the country access to the single market of the European Union (EU). It was not a member of the EU, but in July 2009 the Icelandic parliament, the Althing, voted in favour of application for EU membership and officially applied on 17 July 2009. However, in 2013, opinion polls showed that many Icelanders were now against joining the EU; following 2013 elections the two parties that formed the island's new government – the centrist Progressive Party and the right-wing Independence Party – announced they would hold a referendum on EU membership.

(...)

¹ Desde las primeras alianzas en 1291 hasta la Reforma (Protestante) de 1516

Los **microestados europeos**, un conjunto de pequeños Estados soberanos del continente europeo y las islas de alrededor: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mónaco, San Marino y la Ciudad del Vaticano. Éste último es además el Estado más pequeño del mundo. El sur de Europa es una de las cuatro zonas del mundo donde se concentran los microestados existentes en la actualidad, siendo las otras el Mar Caribe, el Océano Índico y Oceanía.

El término microestado se refiere a Estados independientes y no se debe confundir con el término micronación, que no son ni Estados ni independientes.



El **Principado de Andorra** participa en la Comunidad de Trabajo de los Pirineos y ostentó en 2014 su Presidencia.

El Principado de Andorra (en catalán: *Principat d'Andorra*) es un pequeño país soberano del suroeste de Europa, cuya forma de gobierno es el coprincipado parlamentario. Su territorio está organizado en siete parroquias con una población total de 76 098 habitantes y su capital es Andorra la Vieja. Tiene una extensión de 468 km² y está situado en los Pirineos, entre España y Francia, con una altitud media de 1996 metros sobre el nivel del mar. Limita: por el sur con España, con las comarcas catalanas de Cerdaña, Alto Urgel y Pallars Sobirà; y por el norte con Francia, limitando con el departamento de Ariège, en la región de Mediodía-Pirineos.

Su sistema político tiene como jefes de Estado a los copríncipes de Andorra: el obispo de Urgel, actualmente Joan Enric Vives i Sicília; y el presidente de la República Francesa, en la actualidad François Hollande. El actual jefe de Gobierno es Antoni Martí Petit. El idioma oficial es el catalán.

No tiene fuerzas armadas propias y su defensa es responsabilidad de España y Francia. En caso de emergencias o desastres naturales, se convoca al somatén, formado por los cabezas de familia con nacionalidad andorrana.



El **Principado de Liechtenstein** surgió como estado en 1699 al adquirir los Condes Austriacos de Liechtenstein los señoríos de Vaduz y Schellenberg.

En 1921 se promulga la Constitución tras la Primera Guerra Mundial. Y en 1921-1924 se produce la integración económica con Suiza, formando parte de la Unión Monetaria y Unión Aduanera.

En 1995 se integró en el Espacio Económico Europeo (EEE), lo cual ha obligado a redefinir ciertos términos de la unión aduanera con Suiza, que no pertenece a tal asociación. desde diciembre de 2011 forma parte del espacio de libre circulación europeo (Schengen). Hay una importante influencia cultural histórica de las áreas germanófonas meridionales, en especial Austria, Suiza y Baviera, lo cual hace que su tradición sea alpina. Sigue una política de neutralidad, siendo uno de los pocos países en el mundo sin ejército, pues lo abolió en 1868 debido a sus altos costos. La defensa le corresponde al ejército suizo.



La **República de Malta** es un país insular, independiente desde 1964 y miembro de la UE desde 2004, muy densamente poblado —1.431 hab/km², la más alta densidad de población entre los países de la UE—, compuesto por un archipiélago y situado en el centro del Mediterráneo, al sur de Italia, al oriente de Túnez y al norte de Libia. Debido a su situación estratégica, ha sido gobernado y disputado por diversas potencias a lo largo de los siglos. En 2011 tenía una población de 452.215 habitantes.

Malta es el único microestado que es miembro de la UE.



El **Principado de Mónaco** es una ciudad-estado de Europa Occidental, cuya forma de gobierno es la monarquía hereditaria y constitucional. Su territorio está organizado en diez barrios. Se encuentra entre el mar Mediterráneo y las bajas estribaciones de los Alpes, en la Riviera francesa. Hace frontera terrestre con Francia (4,4 kilómetros) y se encuentra en la cercanía de la frontera franco-italiana. Posee una costa de 4,1 km y un ancho que varía entre los 1700 y 349 metros. El punto más alto del país es el sendero Chemin des Révoires, con una altitud de 161 msnm.

Ocupa el segundo lugar como Estado más pequeño del mundo, siendo el Estado de la Ciudad del Vaticano el primero. Mónaco era un principado italiano, y estuvo ligado a Italia hasta la invasión y anexión francesa a finales del siglo XIX del condado de Niza. La lengua italiana era la lengua oficial hasta 1860. La lengua monegasca es una variante del idioma ligur.



La **Serenísima República de San Marino** es una república constitucional y el Estado soberano más antiguo del mundo. Es un enclave rodeado de territorio italiano, entre Emilia-Romaña y las Marcas. Contiene al Monte Titano, de 739 m, y está a solo 10 kilómetros del mar Adriático, aunque no tiene salida al mar.



El **Estado de la Ciudad del Vaticano** (Status Civitatis Vaticanæ) es un país soberano sin salida al mar, cuyo territorio consta de un enclave dentro de la ciudad de Roma, en la península Itálica.

Tiene una extensión de 0,44 km² y una población de aproximadamente 800 habitantes, por lo que resulta un híbrido de ciudad elevada al rango de Estado independiente, siendo además el país más pequeño del mundo y el territorio independiente más urbanizado del mundo.

Comenzó su existencia como Estado independiente en 1929 tras la firma de los Pactos de Letrán celebrados entre la Santa Sede y el entonces Reino de Italia, que en 1870 había conquistado los Estados Pontificios. Alberga la Santa Sede, máxima institución de la Iglesia católica. Aunque los dos nombres, «Ciudad del Vaticano» y «Santa Sede», se utilizan a menudo como si fueran equivalentes, el primero se refiere a la ciudad y a su territorio, mientras que el segundo se refiere a la institución que dirige la Iglesia y que tiene personalidad jurídica propia como sujeto de Derecho internacional. En rigor, es la Santa Sede, y no el Estado del Vaticano, la que mantiene relaciones diplomáticas con los demás países del mundo. Por otro lado, el Vaticano es quien da el soporte temporal y soberano (sustrato territorial) para la actividad de la Santa Sede.

La máxima autoridad del Vaticano y jefe de Estado del mismo es el papa de la Iglesia católica, por lo que puede considerarse la única teocracia de Europa. El sumo pontífice delega las funciones de gobierno en el secretario de Estado.

Dentro de la Política de Buena Vecindad...



La **República de Bielorrusia** (Rusia Blanca) es un país soberano de Europa Oriental que hasta 1991 formó parte de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas (URSS). Limita al norte con Lituania y Letonia, al este con la Federación de Rusia, al sur con Ucrania y al oeste con Polonia. La capital es Minsk.



La **República de Moldavia** es un país sin litoral, ubicado entre Rumania al oeste y Ucrania al norte, este y sur. La mayoría del territorio está entre los ríos Dniéster y Prut. Se encuentra a sólo 100 km del mar Negro y tiene 4.4 millones de habitantes (2007), la mayoría de ella rumanófono (80%), desglosados según el censo moldavo de 2004 en un 75.8% de moldavos y un 2.2% de rumanos. Cuenta asimismo con considerables minorías de ucranianos (la primera minoría por su número) y rusos. Declaró su independencia con las mismas fronteras que la anterior República Socialista Soviética de Moldavia en 1991, como parte de la disolución de la Unión Soviética; no obstante, una franja del territorio reconocido internacionalmente como moldavo, situado en la orilla oriental del Dniéster, está bajo el control de facto del gobierno separatista de Transnistria desde 1990.

Moldavia es un Estado miembro de las Naciones Unidas, del Consejo de Europa, de la Organización Mundial del Comercio, de OSCE, de GUAM, de la Comunidad de Estados Independientes, de BSEC y de otros organismos internacionales. Moldavia en la actualidad aspira a adherirse a la Unión Europea y ha puesto en marcha los tres primeros años el Plan de Acción en el marco de la Política Europea de Vecindad (PEV).



La **República de Turquía** es un país soberano transcontinental ubicado en Asia y Europa que se extiende por toda la península de Anatolia y Tracia en la zona de los Balcanes. Limita al noreste con Georgia, al este con Armenia, Irán y Azerbaiyán, al norte con el mar Negro, al noroeste con Bulgaria y Grecia, al oeste con el mar Egeo, al sur con Siria y el mar Mediterráneo y al sureste con Irak. La separación entre Anatolia y Tracia está formada por el mar de Mármara y los estrechos de Turquía (el Bósforo y los Dardanelos), que sirven para delimitar la frontera entre Asia y Europa, por lo que se la considera como transcontinental.

Debido a su posición estratégica entre Europa y Asia y entre tres mares, ha sido una encrucijada histórica entre culturas y civilizaciones orientales y occidentales. Su territorio ha sido el hogar de varias grandes civilizaciones y el lugar en el que muchas batallas entre las mismas tuvieron lugar a lo largo de la historia. El país influye en la zona comprendida entre la UE en el oeste y Asia Central en el este, Rusia en el norte y Oriente Medio en el sur, por lo que ha adquirido cada vez más importancia estratégica.

Turquía es una república democrática, secular, unitaria y constitucional, cuyo sistema político fue establecido en 1923 bajo el liderazgo de Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, tras la caída del Imperio otomano como consecuencia de la Primera Guerra Mundial. Turquía está afiliada al Consejo de Europa (1949), la OTAN (1952), la OCDE (1961), la OSCE (1973) y el G-20 (1999). Comenzó las negociaciones para la adhesión plena a la UE en 2005, tras ser miembro asociado desde 1963, y habiendo llegado a un acuerdo de unión aduanera en 1995. Mientras tanto, Turquía ha seguido fomentando estrechas relaciones políticas y económicas con el mundo islámico, especialmente con los estados de Oriente Medio, Asia Central y Asia Oriental. Por su ubicación estratégica es clasificada como potencia de ámbito regional por políticos y economistas de todo el mundo.



Ucrania es un Estado soberano ubicado en el este de Europa. Su forma de gobierno es la república que se rige por un sistema semipresidencial, con la separación del poder entre el ejecutivo, legislativo y judicial. Su territorio está organizado según un Estado unitario compuesto por veinticuatro óblast (regiones o provincias) y dos municipios con un estatuto especial: Kiev, la capital, y Sebastopol, aunque desde marzo de 2014 la península de Crimea constituye una entidad subnacional rusa (el distrito federal de Crimea) no reconocida por la mayor parte de la comunidad internacional conformada por la República de Crimea (un sujeto federal) y por Sebastopol (una ciudad federal).

Limita con Rusia hacia el este, con Bielorrusia al norte, con Polonia, Eslovaquia y Hungría hacia el oeste, con Rumania y Moldavia al suroeste y con el mar Negro y el mar de Azov al sur. La ciudad de Kiev es la capital y la ciudad más grande del país.

Las fronteras de Ucrania están jalonadas de eurorregiones, estructuras para la CTF con sus países vecinos, incluida la Federación Rusa, en cuya frontera se han establecido algunas de las eurorregiones más activas, a pesar de no disponer hasta la fecha de un programa sistemático de CTF. La crisis de 2014 ha puesto toda esta cooperación bajo un gran interrogante.

Un caso especial es, precisamente, la **Federación Rusa...**



La **Federación de Rusia** es el país más extenso del mundo (17 125 246 km², equivalente a la novena parte de la tierra firme del planeta, y con gran variedad de relieves y entornos naturales. Su capital es la ciudad federal de Moscú.

Esta república semipresidencialista, formada por 85 sujetos federales, es el noveno país por población al tener 146 020 000 habitantes. Ocupa todo el Asia del Norte y alrededor del 40% de Europa (principalmente Europa Oriental), siendo un país transcontinental. En Rusia hay nueve zonas horarias, desde UTC+3 hasta UTC+12, sin incluir UTC+5. Rusia tiene las mayores reservas de recursos energéticos y minerales del mundo todavía sin explotar y es considerada la mayor superpotencia energética. Posee las mayores reservas de recursos forestales y la cuarta parte de agua dulce no congelada del mundo.

Rusia es el país que delimita con más países, un total de 16, y el que tiene las fronteras más extensas. Tiene fronteras terrestres con los siguientes países (empezando por el noroeste y siguiendo el sentido antihorario): Noruega, Finlandia, Estonia, Letonia, Bielorrusia, Lituania, Polonia, Ucrania, Georgia, Azerbaiyán, Kazajistán, China, Mongolia y Corea del Norte. Además de varios de los anteriores, comparte fronteras marítimas también con Japón y Alaska. Asimismo comparte fronteras con los Estados con reconocimiento limitado, Abjasia y Osetia del Sur. Sus costas están bañadas por el océano Ártico, el océano Pacífico del Norte, y por mares interiores como el mar Báltico, el mar Negro y el mar Caspio.

En cuanto a los países del
Instrumento de Pre-Adhesión (IPA):



La **República de Albania** es un país del sureste de Europa. Limita con Montenegro al noroeste, con Kosovo al noreste, con Macedonia al este y con Grecia por el sur y el sureste. Tiene costa hacia el mar Adriático en el oeste y hacia el mar Jónico al suroeste. Italia está a solo 72 km, al otro lado del estrecho de Otranto que une el mar Adriático con el Jónico.



Bosnia y Herzegovina es un país soberano europeo con capital en Sarajevo, situado en la confluencia de Europa central y del sudeste europeo, y que limita con Croacia, al norte, oeste y sur; con Serbia al este; con Montenegro al este y al sur, y con el Mar Adriático (solo 30 kilómetros). En 1992 la antigua República Socialista de Bosnia y Herzegovina obtuvo su independencia como República de Bosnia y Herzegovina, como una de las seis unidades federales constituyentes de la antigua Yugoslavia surgida al final de la Primera Guerra Mundial, y quedó constituida como república federal según los términos de los acuerdos de Dayton, que preveían su administración tutelada por un alto representante elegido por el Consejo de la UE. Su estructura es descentralizada y dividida en dos entidades: la Federación de Bosnia y Herzegovina y la República Srpska.



La **República de Macedonia** o antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia (FYROM en sus siglas en inglés) es un Estado independiente sin litoral, situado en la península balcánica, en el sureste de Europa. Limita al norte con Serbia (incluyendo Kosovo), al este con Bulgaria, al sur con Grecia y al oeste con Albania. Su nombre proviene de la región histórica homónima y que incluye la región del noroeste de la provincia griega del mismo nombre, la Macedonia histórica, cuna de Filipo II y Alejandro Magno. Su capital es Skopie, con más de 700.000 habitantes. Actualmente Macedonia es un candidato oficial para el acceso a la UE.



Montenegro (Crna Gora) es un país del sureste de Europa situado en la Península Balcánica, a orillas del mar Adriático. Limita por el norte con Bosnia y Herzegovina y Serbia; Albania por el sureste; Croacia por el oeste; y con el territorio de Kosovo por el este. Tiene una superficie de 13.812 km² en los que habitan 625.266 personas de acuerdo al último censo realizado en 2011. La actual capital y ciudad más poblada e importante es Podgorica, aunque la capital monárquica e histórica es la ciudad de Cetiña.



La **República de Serbia** es un país soberano situado en la península balcánica, en el sureste de Europa. Limita con Hungría al norte; con Rumania y Bulgaria al este; con Macedonia y Albania al sur; y con Bosnia y Herzegovina, Croacia y Montenegro al oeste. Su capital y ciudad más poblada es Belgrado.

El caso especial de **Gibraltar** está siendo revisado por un grupo de expertos en el marco de la colaboración de la ARFE con la Universidad de Cádiz, con la participación de varios municipios del Campo de Gibraltar, la Junta de Andalucía y el Gobierno de Gibraltar.



Gibraltar is a British Overseas Territory located on the southern end of the Iberian Peninsula. It has an area of 6.7 km² (2.6 sq mi) and shares its northern border with Spain. The Rock of Gibraltar is the major landmark of the region. At its foot is a densely populated city area, home to over 30,000 Gibraltarians and other nationalities.

The sovereignty of Gibraltar is a major point of contention in Anglo-Spanish relations as Spain asserts a claim to the territory. Gibraltarians overwhelmingly rejected proposals for Spanish sovereignty in a 1967 referendum and again in 2002. Under the Gibraltar constitution of 2006, Gibraltar governs its own affairs, though some powers, such as defence and foreign relations, remain the responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom.

INSTRUMENTOS PARA LA CTF EN LAS FRONTERAS EXTERIORES DE LA UE Y CON LOS PAÍSES CANDIDATOS A LA ADHESIÓN

Como ya se ha indicado en el capítulo 4, los primeros instrumentos de CTF en las Fronteras Exteriores de la UE —el primer programa Phare CBC (1994-1999) y el primer Tacis CBC (1996-1999)— pueden considerarse una consecuencia de la Iniciativa Comunitaria Interreg (1990-1993). De hecho, coincidieron con Interreg II (1994-1999) en un importante momento de aprendizaje y evolución para los programas transfronterizos de las fronteras internas y externas de la UE e iniciaron un proceso de aproximación para coordinar esfuerzos que aún continúan².

El Programa **Phare** fue creado originalmente en 1989 como “Polonia y Hungría: Ayuda a la Reestructuración de sus Economías”, fue uno de los tres instrumentos de pre-adhesión financiados por la UE para ayudar a los países candidatos de Europa Central y Oriental en sus preparativos para el acceso a la UE. Phare se expandió de Polonia y Hungría a diez países. Se apoyó a ocho de los diez países de la adhesión de 2004: Eslovaquia, Eslovenia, Estonia, Hungría, Letonia, Lituania, Polonia y la República Checa, así como a los que accedieron en 2007 (Bulgaria y Rumanía) en un periodo de masiva reestructuración política y económica.

Hasta 2000, algunos países balcánicos occidentales (Albania, Macedonia y Bosnia-Herzegovina) también fueron beneficiarios de Phare. Entre 2001 y 2006, el programa **CARDS** proporcionó ayuda financiera a estos países y al resto de los Balcanes Occidentales. Estos y otros programas e instrumentos financieros para países candidatos o candidatos potenciales a la adhesión,

como ISPA, SAPARD o el instrumento financiero para Turquía fueron reemplazados por el Instrumento de Pre-Adhesión (**IPA**) a partir de enero de 2007.

La introducción del Instrumento **Phare CBC** (cooperación transfronteriza) en 1994 en el marco del Programa **Phare** (1989-2006), supuso la mayor y más innovadora iniciativa para las regiones fronterizas de los países de Europa Central con los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea. El programa Phare adoptó el mismo calendario que Interreg II-A (1994-1999) abarcando 15 fronteras nacionales (a través de 17 programas)³. También se adaptó posteriormente a Interreg III-A (2000-2006), cuyos detalles se exponen más adelante, aunque debe destacarse el gran número de proyectos desarrollado a lo largo de Phare CBC.

Como ya se ha indicado, Interreg II y Phare CBC introdujeron un importante avance al establecer Comités de Programación y Seguimiento conjuntos para cada una de las fronteras, implicando a los representantes de los países interesados y a los servicios de la Comisión responsable de Interreg y del Phare CBC. Este desarrollo fue muy significativo en aspectos tales como:

- Los Comités de Programación y Seguimiento Conjuntos se establecieron y funcionaron en todas las fronteras;
- Cubrían tanto aspectos programáticos como de ejecución;
- Incluían representantes del nivel regional (euroregiones).

Las estructuras transfronterizas para cada frontera nacional se desarrollaron de manera bien distinta, pero se

² Los programas de CTF de Interreg dependen de la Dirección General de Política Regional y Urbana de la Comisión Europea (DG Regio), mientras que los programas del Instrumento de Buena Vecindad dependen de la Dirección General de Vecindad y Ampliación (DG Near). Los programas transfronterizos del Instrumento

de Pre-Adhesión (IPA) también dependen de DG Regio.

³ ARFE-LACE, *Vademecum de Cooperación Transfronteriza e Interregional en las fronteras exteriores de la Unión Europea*, septiembre de 1997.

establecieron en prácticamente todos los programas Phare CBC.

En 1996, un nuevo reglamento **Tacis** y una línea presupuestaria específica del Parlamento Europeo permitieron el establecimiento de un Instrumento **Tacis CBC** (para las regiones fronterizas de los países de la antigua Unión Soviética) cubriendo, entre otras, las regiones fronterizas de Rusia con Finlandia. El programa se desarrolló bajo el procedimiento normal de Tacis, no existiendo acuerdos institucionales de naturaleza transfronteriza durante este periodo.

Lo mismo se aplica al **Programa MEDA**, que se introdujo en 1997 a partir del Proceso del Barcelona (Diálogo Euro-Mediterráneo) para países mediterráneos que no pertenecen a la UE y que carecía de provisiones específicas para programas de CTF.

Para completar este mapa de la cooperación, la UE adoptaría en el siguiente periodo el Programa **CARDS**, una serie de programas específicos para los países Balcánicos—Albania, Bosnia y Herzegovina, Croacia, la República Federal de Yugoslavia y la ex República Yugoslava de Macedonia (FYROM), desarrollado entre 2000 y 2006—).

Desde 1990 la UE financió asimismo proyectos LACE de la ARFE en estos territorios, que proporcionaron asesoramiento técnico y promovieron el intercambio de buenas prácticas y la creación de redes entre las regiones fronterizas.

El Programa Phare CBC

Como se ha expuesto anteriormente, el Programa Phare es uno de los tres instrumentos de pre-adhesión financiados por la UE para ayudar a los países candidatos de los Países de Europa Central y Oriental (PECOs) en sus preparativos para incorporarse a la Unión. Fue creado originalmente en

1989 como Programa de Asistencia a la Reestructuración de las Economías de Polonia y Hungría⁴, y de ahí se expandió para cubrir a ocho de los diez países que accederían a la UE en 2004 y los dos que lo harían en 2007, en un periodo de masiva reestructuración política y económica. Hasta 2000, los países balcánicos occidentales (Albania, ex República Yugoslava de Macedonia y Bosnia-Herzegovina) también fueron beneficiarios de Phare. Sin embargo, entre 2001 y 2006 el Programa CARDS (Ayuda Comunitaria para la Estabilidad, Desarrollo y Reconstrucción de los Balcanes) se encargó de la ayuda financiera a estos países y otros de los Balcanes Occidentales.

Cuando los países elegibles para Phare se incorporaron como miembros de la UE en 2004, se consideró 2003 como último año de programación, 2005 como último de contratación de proyectos, y 2006 último año de pagos Phare. El 1º de enero de 2007, el Programa Phare fue reemplazado por el Instrumento de Pre-Adhesión (IPA).

El Programa **Phare CBC** se creó en 1994 para el fomento de la cooperación transfronteriza entre regiones de los PECO y de la UE. Las zonas elegibles eran las regiones de los PECO que hacían frontera con los Estados miembros de la UE. En el periodo 1994-1999, los 17 programas Phare CBC abarcaron 15 fronteras nacionales y recibieron fondos de la UE por valor de mil millones de euros —cantidad superior a los fondos de la UE asignados a sus equivalentes programas de Interreg IIA—. Los programas Phare CBC apoyaron principalmente acciones en el ámbito de las infraestructuras (transportes y medio ambiente) y de desarrollo económico. Algunos programas también apoyaron pequeños proyectos persona a persona y otras acciones a pequeña escala.

⁴ (PHARE son las siglas de este programa en inglés: *Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies*)

El Reglamento original de la Comisión relativo a Phare CBC fue presentado en 1994 con la finalidad de convertirse en el equivalente de Interreg y crear programas Phare CBC en los PECOS fronterizos con Estados miembros de la UE. Esa aproximación entre los programas de Interreg y los de Phare CBC sólo se consiguió hasta cierto punto. En 1998 la Comisión presentó un nuevo Reglamento regulador de Phare CBC⁵ con los siguientes objetivos:

- Promover la cooperación de regiones fronterizas en PECOS con regiones vecinas de la UE y de los países de la adhesión y, de esta forma, ayudarles a superar los problemas específicos de desarrollo fruto de su posición en las economías nacionales, del interés de la población local y de una forma compatible con la protección del medio ambiente; y
- promover la creación y el desarrollo de redes de cooperación a ambos lados de la frontera, y el establecimiento de lazos entre estas y otras redes más amplias en la UE.

El Reglamento Phare CBC de 1998 estableció algunos parámetros clave para la CTF relativos a las fronteras de los PECOS:

- amplió las zonas elegibles incluyendo las fronteras de los PECOS entre sí en los 10 países candidatos de Europa Central;
- redefinió las acciones elegibles para Phare CBC (ver *Tabla A.5.1. en la pág. 165*) (se incluye otra tabla con las medidas prioritarias de Interreg IIIA para poder comparar);
- introdujo nuevos instrumentos de planificación y ejecución:

- Documentos de Programación Conjuntos;
- Comités de Cooperación Conjuntos; y
- Fondos para Pequeños Proyectos conjuntos.

Los programas Phare CBC para 1999 y 2000 se prepararon conforme al nuevo Reglamento, pero no tuvieron los beneficios de acciones equivalentes en Interreg. En el siguiente periodo de los Fondos Estructurales de la UE (2000-2006) Phare CBC aspiraba a combinarse con la vertiente A de Interreg. Durante todo el año 2000 se prepararon las Estrategias de CTF y los Documentos de Programación Conjunta, sobre todo desde la publicación en abril de 2000 de las directrices para Interreg III.

En el período posterior al 2000 todas las regiones fronterizas de la Unión Europea y de los PECOS habrían de guiarse por estos nuevos Documentos de Programación Conjunta aprobados conforme a las normas y procedimientos de los Fondos Estructurales en el lado de la UE (como un Programa de Iniciativa Comunitaria), y conforme a las normativas y procedimientos Phare en el lado de los PECOS. Un enfoque similar se aplicó a las fronteras entre los propios PECOS elegibles en Phare CBC, mientras se preparaban los Documentos de Programación Conjunta (aunque se aplicaran las normativas y procedimientos normales, incluso en dichos casos la aprobación financiera tenía que ser ratificada por ambas partes de manera independiente).

Incluir conclusiones de la Evaluación de esta fase de Phare CBC.

⁵ Reglamento de la Comisión 2760/98

Tabla A.5.1 (A.4.4): **Acciones elegibles en Phare CBC**

- a) Reducción de obstáculos institucionales y administrativos para permitir la libre circulación de personas, productos o servicios a través de la frontera, a la vez que se tienen en cuenta los aspectos de seguridad de dicha circulación.
- b) Mejora de las infraestructuras, especialmente las relacionadas con las comunicaciones y el suministro local de electricidad, gas y agua que aporten beneficios a través de las fronteras.
- c) Protección del medio ambiente, por ejemplo: gestión de residuos, gestión medioambiental y prevención de la contaminación, que aborde problemas agravados por la proximidad de las fronteras exteriores.
- d) Medidas de desarrollo rural y agrícola, especialmente aquellos proyectos que faciliten la CTF.
- e) Medidas en el sector energético y de transportes que complementen el desarrollo de redes transeuropeas de acuerdo con las orientaciones adoptadas por la Comisión.
- f) Acciones relacionadas con la justicia y la política comunitaria de interior.
- g) Promoción de la cooperación empresarial, creación de empresas, cooperación financiera y entre instituciones representativas del sector empresarial (p. e.: cámaras de comercio).
- h) Ayudas a la inversión y creación de servicios e instalaciones de apoyo, en especial para la transferencia de tecnología y para el marketing de las Pymes.
- i) Formación y medidas de fomento del empleo.
- j) Desarrollo de la economía local, incluido el desarrollo turístico.
- k) Medidas para promover la cooperación en materia sanitaria, especialmente la utilización transfronteriza de recursos e instalaciones.
- l) Desarrollo o creación de instalaciones y recursos para mejorar el flujo de información y comunicación entre las regiones fronterizas, incluido el apoyo a los medios de comunicación transfronterizos (radio, televisión, periódicos y otros medios).
- m) Intercambios culturales.
- n) Iniciativas de formación, educación y empleo local.

Tabla A.5.2 (A.4.3): **Medidas prioritarias de Interreg III-A**

- a) Promoción del desarrollo costero, rural y urbano.
- b) Fomento empresarial y desarrollo de pequeñas empresas (incluidas las del sector turístico) y fomento de iniciativas de empleo local.
- c) Fomento de la integración del mercado laboral y la inclusión social.
- d) Uso compartido de recursos humanos e instalaciones de investigación, desarrollo tecnológico, educación, cultura, comunicaciones y sanidad, para mejorar la productividad y crear empleo sostenible.
- e) Fomento de la protección del medio ambiente (local, global), mejora de la eficiencia energética y promoción de fuentes de energía renovables.
- f) Mejora del transporte (especialmente medidas que fomenten el uso de tipos de transporte más respetuosos con el medio ambiente), redes de información y comunicación y servicios, y sistemas de agua y energía.
- g) Desarrollo de la cooperación legal y administrativa para promover el desarrollo económico y la cohesión social.
- h) Incremento del potencial institucional y humano de la CTF para promover el desarrollo económico y la cohesión social.

Coordinación de Interreg III-A y Phare CBC

La introducción de Phare CBC en 1994 con la intención de replicar el modelo de Interreg supuso muchas diferencias en la aplicación de ambos reglamentos, lo que dificultó la coordinación de programas y acciones transfronterizas entre estos dos instrumentos de la UE. Ello es debido principalmente a los reglamentos "base" que regulan a ambos instrumentos: Los reglamentos de los Fondos Estructurales en el caso de Interreg, y el reglamento principal de Phare⁶ y el Reglamento Financiero general relativo a la ayuda externa⁷ en el caso de Phare CBC. A continuación se resumen las principales diferencias:

- los programas de Interreg disponen de estrictas asignaciones financieras de fondos de la UE para toda la duración del programa, mientras que los programas Phare CBC tenían (en el mejor de los casos) marcos indicativos plurianuales.
- Los programas de Interreg son aprobados de una sola vez por la Comisión Europea para un período plurianual, (2000-2006 en Interreg III) mientras que los programas Phare CBC tenían que ser aprobados anualmente por la Comisión.
- Los proyectos individuales de Interreg no requieren aprobación por parte de la Comisión Europea, pero los proyectos Phare CBC tenían que ser presentados a la Comisión para su aprobación o endoso *ex ante*, a excepción de proyectos muy pequeños.
- No existen limitaciones respecto al tamaño de los proyectos de Interreg, mientras que para los proyectos Phare se exigía un mínimo de 2 millones de €, salvo los proyectos de los fondos para pequeños proyectos (*small project funds*) de los programas Phare CBC.

- Ciertas acciones elegibles en Phare CBC sólo podían ser utilizadas para proyectos muy pequeños (acciones de la j) a la n) de la tabla A.4.4).

Las regiones fronterizas y la ARFE solicitaron en repetidas ocasiones a la Comisión Europea que revisara los reglamentos aplicados a las acciones Phare CBC de manera que se aproximaran más a Interreg. La normativa Phare CBC de diciembre de 1998 dio un primer paso en esta dirección al introducir los Comités de Cooperación Conjunta, los Documentos de Programación Conjunta y los Fondos para Pequeños Proyectos conjuntos. Estas modificaciones se reforzaron con las directrices de la Comisión para Interreg III, que incluía un apartado sobre la coordinación de Interreg con Phare CBC y otros programas de ayuda exterior. No obstante, los diferentes sistemas de regulación de Interreg y Phare CBC impidieron poner a ambos lados a trabajar conjuntamente en la puesta en marcha de programas y proyectos.

Con el fin de superar estas dificultades, la Comisión Europea aprobó el 27 de octubre de 2000 una Comunicación del Sr. Verheugen, Comisario encargado de la Ampliación, titulado **Revisión de Phare 2000 – Fortaleciendo los Preparativos para la Adhesión**. Este informe anunciaba cambios para que **"Phare CBC evolucionara hacia Interreg"**. Dichos cambios entraron en vigor a partir de 2001 e incluían una mayor utilización de subvenciones para proyectos de entre 50.000 € y 2 millones. Esto habría de reducir los requisitos de aprobación *ex ante* de la Comisión para proyectos individuales, y eliminaría las limitaciones respecto al tamaño del proyecto. La revisión también confirmaba la continuación de los Fondos para Pequeños Proyectos Conjuntos, para proyectos que no superaran los 50.000 €. Las nuevas normativas relativas a la puesta en

⁶ Reglamento del Consejo 3906/89

⁷ Reglamento Financiero del Consejo 21/12/1977, OJ L 356

práctica de programas y proyectos, incluidos los programas de subvenciones, se recogieron en la Guía de la Comisión Europea **Guía práctica de procedimientos contractuales para Phare, Ispa y Sapard**⁸ (*Practical Guide to Phare, Ispa & Sapard contract procedures*).

Phare CREDO

El programa Phare CREDO se creó en 1996 con el fin de fomentar la CTF “Este-Este” entre regiones fronterizas y comunidades de los PECOS entre sí y con los Nuevos Estados Independientes. Los objetivos de CREDO era fomentar buenas relaciones de vecindad y estabilidad social en las regiones fronterizas, promover una CTF que pueda contribuir al crecimiento económico y al desarrollo de la comunidad, así como contribuir a la descentralización de los PECOS. Este programa incluía una serie de proyectos multisectoriales: desarrollo económico, cooperación sociocultural, servicios urbanos y regionales, recursos humanos, medio ambiente y gobierno local y regional. Los beneficiarios elegibles fueron entidades descentralizadas, organismos públicos y privados y organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro.

El programa CREDO elevó el perfil y las oportunidades de CTF en muchas fronteras y apoyó proyectos genuinamente transfronterizos con socios de ambos lados de la frontera. Sin embargo, fue recibido negativamente en muchas regiones fronterizas debido a su estructura y gestión excesivamente burocráticas y complejas, al tamaño relativamente pequeño del presupuesto general y el retraso en su puesta en marcha, así como a la ausencia de un enfoque programático similar al de Interreg y Phare CBC. Por todo ello la Comisión Europea decidió sustituir el programa CREDO en las fronteras entre países candidatos ampliando las

regiones elegibles para el programa Phare CBC (véase más arriba). Pero seguía sin estar muy claro (diciembre de 2000) cómo podía ofrecerse apoyo de Phare para la CTF en otras regiones fronterizas de los países beneficiarios de Phare que no estaban cubiertas por Phare CBC.

Tacis CBC

El **Programa TACIS** (1991-2006) fue una iniciativa de la UE para apoyar la transición a la economía de mercado y el fortalecimiento de la democracia en la Comunidad de Estados Independientes (CEI) —Armenia, Azerbaiyán, Bielorrusia, Federación Rusa, Georgia, Kazajistán, Kirguistán, Moldavia, Tayikistán, Turkmenistán, Ucrania, Uzbekistán— y en Mongolia. En 2007, los programas TACIS y MEDA quedaron integrados en el Instrumento Europeo de Buena Vecindad y Partenariado (ENPI en sus siglas en inglés), el instrumento financiero de la Política Europea de Buena Vecindad.

El programa de CTF de Tacis (**Tacis CBC**) se lanzó en 1996 para fomentar actividades transfronterizas en las fronteras occidentales de los países beneficiarios del programa Tacis —es decir, entre las fronteras occidentales de las regiones de la federación Rusa, Bielorrusia, Ucrania y Moldavia— con los países de la UE y con los PECOS. El programa Tacis CBC se centró principalmente en las redes fronterizas tales como pasos fronterizos, CTF y cooperación medioambiental a nivel local, incluyendo el Instrumento para Pequeños Proyectos del Báltico. El programa de 1997 incluía una Iniciativa Regional de Generación de Capacidades cuya puesta en marcha fue asignada a la ARFE (véase más abajo).

Tacis CBC era parte de un Programa Tacis de mayor envergadura destinado a la asistencia para la reforma y la recuperación económica de los Nuevos

⁸ La Guía Práctica se encuentra en la página web de la Comisión Europea:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/scr/tender/testing/practguide/annexes_en.htm

Estados Independientes (NEI) y Mongolia. El reglamento del Consejo de 1999 hacía hincapié en la CTF entre los NEI, la EU y los PECOs, y entre los propios NEI entre sí. Establecía que la CTF tenía que servir en primer lugar para:

- ayudar a las regiones fronterizas a superar los problemas específicos derivados de su relativo aislamiento;
- fomentar el vínculo entre redes de ambos lados de la frontera, tales como los pasos fronterizos;
- acelerar el proceso de transformación en los estados socios mediante su cooperación con regiones fronterizas de la EU o los PECOs; y
- reducir la contaminación y los riesgos medioambientales transfronterizos.

Tacis CBC carecía de un enfoque programático y de acuerdos específicos para su manejo a nivel regional o institucional equiparables a Interreg (Vertiente A) o Phare CBC. Por ello, la coordinación entre las acciones transfronterizas de programas como Tacis y otros instrumentos financieros de la UE había demostrado ser prácticamente imposible a mitad de su aplicación (año 2000).

Hoy existe la posibilidad de programas multifondo, pero hay muchas dificultades para utilizarlos de forma transfronteriza.

El Programa CARDS

En diciembre de 2000 la UE adoptó un nuevo reglamento⁹ que establecía un marco único para la asistencia a los países balcánicos occidentales conocido como **CARDS** (Asistencia comunitaria para la reconstrucción, el desarrollo y la estabilización) dirigido a Albania, Bosnia

y Herzegovina, Croacia, la República Federal de Yugoslavia y la ex República Yugoslava de Macedonia (FYROM). CARDS había de fomentar entre otras cosas *“el desarrollo de unas relaciones más estrechas entre los países receptores, entre ellos y la UE y entre ellos y los países candidatos a la adhesión a la UE, en coordinación con otros instrumentos para la cooperación transfronteriza, transnacional e interregional con países que no pertenecen a la UE”*.

Esto supuso que los programas Phare CBC entre Albania y Grecia, y la ex República Yugoslava de Macedonia (FYROM) con Grecia, fueran sustituidos por programas CARDS, pudiéndose desarrollar nuevos programas, por ejemplo entre Croacia y Eslovenia, Croacia y Hungría, o entre Bulgaria y FYROM.

En 2000 varios instrumentos financieros se pusieron a disposición de los países candidatos hasta su ingreso: SAPARD e ISPA. A partir de 2007 estos programas (Phare, ISPA, SAPARD y CARDS) fueron reemplazados por el **Instrumento de Ayuda a la Preadhesión (IPA)**. Al contrario que en los programas anteriores, IPA ofrece asistencia tanto a los países candidatos formalmente a la adhesión a la UE como a los candidatos potenciales.

Croacia sólo pudo optar a la asistencia para proyectos y programas de dimensión regional, ya que en 2004 se reconoció su calidad de país candidato, siendo beneficiaria de la estrategia y los instrumentos de preadhesión.

El objetivo de CARDS era hacer partícipes a estos países de los procesos de estabilización y de asociación, y en particular:

- su reconstrucción;
- la estabilización de la región;

⁹ Reglamento del Consejo 2666/2000 de 5 de diciembre, relativo a la ayuda a Albania, Bosnia y Herzegovina, Croacia, la República Federativa de Yugoslavia y la ex República Yugoslava de

Macedonia, derogando el reglamento OBNOVA y modificando el de PHARE

- la ayuda al retorno de refugiados y desplazados;
- el apoyo a la democracia, el Estado de Derecho, los derechos humanos y de las minorías, la sociedad civil, los medios de comunicación independientes y la lucha contra la delincuencia organizada;
- el desarrollo de una economía de mercado duradera;
- la lucha contra la pobreza, la igualdad de género, la educación, la formación y la recuperación del medio ambiente;
- la cooperación regional, transnacional, internacional e inter-regional de los países beneficiarios con los de la Unión y otros países de la región.

Se estableció un marco estratégico para 2002-2006 y programas orientativos plurianuales para cada país por periodos de tres años.

El Programa MEDA

La UE introdujo modificaciones en el reglamento del programa **MEDA** (apoyo financiero y técnico para los países Mediterráneos que no pertenecen a la UE) con el fin de incorporar a las autoridades locales y regionales (ALRs). Aunque estaba previsto el apoyo de la UE para acciones transfronterizas en MEDA, no se dio ningún acuerdo programático, institucional o de otra índole equivalente a los de Interreg (Vertiente A) o Phare CBC. Dichos acuerdos eran muy necesarios para lograr una coordinación eficaz con Interreg en fronteras como la de España y Marruecos, Gibraltar y Marruecos, Grecia y Chipre o Grecia y Turquía.

A pesar de las facilidades técnicas y de los acuerdos políticos, la evolución de los acontecimientos, especialmente en el Sur del Mediterráneo (*Primavera Árabe*) y posteriormente la proliferación de acciones terroristas o las oleadas de refugiados, no han permitido un funcionamiento normalizado de estos

programas. No obstante, el proceso de diálogo Euro-Mediterráneo (*Proceso de Barcelona*) se ha visto fortalecido enormemente gracias a la participación de ALRs en el marco de iniciativas promovidas por las instituciones europeas y, especialmente, por el Comité de las Regiones. Este ha sido el caso de ARLEM, la Asamblea Regional y Local Euro-Mediterránea, que avanza poco a poco en la definición de un papel más concreto para las autoridades locales y regionales.

El Proyecto LACE

LACE es un proyecto de la ARFE que fue lanzado en 1990, coincidiendo con la introducción de Interreg, como observatorio europeo de la cooperación transfronteriza. El proyecto LACE-TAP (*Technical Assistance and Promotion of Cross-Border Cooperation*) cubría el último período de aplicación de Interreg IIA (1999-2001; la regla n+2 permite ejecutar el programa hasta dos años después de terminado el periodo inicialmente previsto).

Desde su concepción el proyecto LACE estuvo estrechamente ligado a Interreg. En concreto, el proyecto LACE fomentó la CTF y las estructuras transfronterizas por toda la UE, participó muy activamente en el fortalecimiento de los nexos entre regiones fronterizas y facilitó la transferencia de conocimientos y buenas prácticas a las regiones fronterizas menos desarrolladas. LACE-TAP fue un proyecto gestionado por la ARFE y se financió en parte con una subvención europea y en parte por las contribuciones regionales y de la propia ARFE.

En 1996-1997 y 1999-2000 la Comisión Europea financió actividades de este tipo en los países de Europa Central mediante el programa LACE-Phare CBC, gestionado también por la ARFE. En el cuadro siguiente se resumen las actividades y servicios de los programas LACE-TAP y LACE-Phare CBC.

Tabla A.5.3: **Principales actividades de los proyectos LACE**

- Establecimiento de **contactos permanentes** entre profesionales de la CTF (en Interreg y Phare CBC) permitiendo el intercambio de conocimientos y experiencias.
- **Página Web** con publicaciones de LACE, reseñas de las regiones fronterizas e información sobre programas y proyectos.
- Se organizaron **talleres, seminarios y conferencias** en las regiones fronterizas que proporcionaron un foro adecuado para entrar en contacto, debatir y asesorarse sobre aspectos políticos y de puesta en práctica de la CTF, incluidos los programas TF y sus estructuras.
- Se elaboraron y editaron **publicaciones**, incluidas publicaciones técnicas como las primeras ediciones del presente Manual (Guía Práctica), hojas informativas, una revista a todo color dirigida al público en general (dependiente de LACE-TAP) y un boletín informativo denominado LACE-Phare CBC.
- Se ofreció **asesoramiento** a las regiones fronterizas y a la Comisión Europea, elaborándose informes específicos (por ejemplo, Aspectos Institucionales de la Cooperación Transfronteriza, Debate sobre el futuro de la Cooperación Marítima, Estudio sobre Ingeniería Financiera).
- Se abrieron 10 **oficinas LACE** en las regiones fronterizas de la UE con el programa LACE-TAP y 6 **Puntos de información** en las regiones fronterizas de los PECO con el programa LACE-Phare CBC, con el fin de reunir información sobre los programas, proyectos, estrategias, etc., divulgar la información sobre buenas prácticas, ayudar en la organización de talleres, conferencias y traducciones, y promover el contacto entre regiones fronterizas.
- Se creó un **Comité técnico-científico** integrado por investigadores procedentes de universidades y centros de investigación, ofreciendo contribuciones especializadas sobre asuntos estratégicos y políticos, así como publicaciones.

En abril de 2000 la Comisión encargó a la ARFE la aplicación de la Iniciativa Regional de Generación de Capacidades en el marco del programa Tacis CBC. Esta Iniciativa cubría las regiones fronterizas occidentales de la Federación Rusa, Bielorrusia, Ucrania y Moldavia. Además aportó asesoramiento técnico a corto y largo plazo, informes de evaluación en las regiones fronterizas, seminarios de formación y visitas de estudio.

ENPI CBC 2007-2013

Programas Operativos de CTF del Instrumento Europeo de Buena Vecindad y Asociación (ENPI):

En el periodo 2007-2013 este instrumento (ENPI CBC) incluyó 15 Programas Operativos de CTF, con una participación cada vez mayor de ALRs. Interact elaboró unas fichas informativas sobre estos Programas. La mayor parte de las medidas tienen un impacto en el desarrollo local y regional, siendo el objetivo general de los programas la intensificación y profundización en la cooperación en todos los campos entre las administraciones regionales y locales de las áreas elegibles. Hemos seleccionado aquellas prioridades y medidas principales para las ALRs en todos los programas ENPI CBC (esta información está disponible únicamente en inglés) y también estamos incorporando vínculos a los informes finales (disponibles):

Tabla A.5.4 : **9 programas ENPI CBC 2007-2013 en las fronteras terrestres:**

- **Kolarctic** (FI, NO, RU, SE), 22,241M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Consejo General de Laponia (FI)
http://admin.interact-eu.net/downloads/1320/Interact_Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_Kolarctic_Programme_2013.pdf

Priority 1 "Economic and social development" stresses to focus on the specific needs of the participating regions.

Priority 2 "Common challenges" stresses the need to jointly face common issues.

Priority 3 "People-to-people cooperation and identity building" highlights local governance and mutual understanding between all stakeholders.

Kolarctic ENPI CBC has granted financing to totally 50 projects during the programme period 2007-2013. In the projects, the project partners are a wide range of public and private organisations on the Kolarctic region. The core programme region consists of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark counties in Norway, Norrbotten in Sweden, Lapland in Finland, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions and Nenets autonomous district in Russia.

In many contexts, the region is also being referred to as the Barents region. The Kolarctic ENPI CBC programme region differs from the region known as the Barents Euro-Arctic region somewhat: the latter includes also Kainuu region in Finland and Komi republic in Russia. Kainuu and Komi are not eligible regions in Kolarctic ENPI CBC.
- **Karelia** (FI-RU) 23,203 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Consejo Regional de Oulu (FI)
http://admin.interact-eu.net/downloads/1319/Interact_Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_Karelia_Programme_2013.pdf

Priority 1 "Economic development", and Priority 2 "Quality of life" focus on increasing CB activity in many fields: economic, business, tourism, services, wellbeing, environment, society, etc., which means a stronger involvement of local and regional players.

<http://www.kareliaenpi.eu/>

Cooperation between Kainuu, North Karelia, Oulu region and the Republic of Karelia was implemented in the Karelia ENPI CBC Programme during the years 2007-2013. The programme was funded by the European Union, Russia and Finland. The aim was to increase wellbeing in the programme region.
- **Sudeste de Finlandia-Rusia**, 36,185 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Consejo Regional de Carelia del Sur (FI)
http://admin.interact-eu.net/downloads/1318/Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_South_East_Finland_Russia_Programme_2013.pdf

Priority 1 "Economic development" includes many joint measures to strengthen local and regional sustainable economic development in the programme area, including rural development.

Priority 2 "Common challenges-border-crossing and the environment" also includes many measures on security, transit and management of the border, through the cooperation between local and regional authorities and organisations in order to minimise risks.

Priority 3 "Social development and civic society" includes measures to strengthen people-to-people and civic society contacts at regional and local levels, as well as to enhance cross-border contacts between civic society groups and NGOs in view of promoting local governance and mutual understanding.

- <http://www.enicbc.fi/eni/programme/>; a report of this programme can be downloaded [here](#).
- **Estonia-Letonia-Rusia**, 47,775 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Ministerio de Desarrollo Regional y Gobiernos Locales de Letonia
http://admin.interact-eu.net/downloads/1317/Interact_Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_Estonia_Latvia_Russia_Programme_2013.pdf
 Priority 3 "Promotion of People-to-People Cooperation" promotes small scale activities to develop local initiatives, and to increase administrative capacities of local and regional authorities.
<http://www.estlatrus.eu/>
 The JTS of this programme was closed at the end of 2016
 - **Letonia-Lituania-Bielorrusia**, 41,737 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Ministerio del Interior de Lituania, Departamento de Política Regional
http://admin.interact-eu.net/downloads/1316/Interact_Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_Latvia_Lithuania_Belarus_Programme_2013.pdf
 Priority 1 "Promoting sustainable cross border development and social development" includes common regional and local development/territorial planning.
 Priority 2 "Addressing common challenges" stresses coordination and joint planning, with a strong focus on the protection and sustainable management of the environment.
<http://www.enpi-cbc.eu/>
 Muchas dificultades para que Bielorrusia pueda absorber los fondos ENPI. Programas modificados en el nuevo periodo 2014-2020.
 - **Lituania-Polonia-Rusia**, 132,130 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Ministerio de Desarrollo Regional de Polonia
http://admin.interact-eu.net/downloads/1314/Interact_Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_Lithuania_Poland_Russia_Programme_2013.pdf
 Priority 2 "Pursuing social, economic and spatial development" includes, amongst other measures, the development of human potential by improvement of social conditions, governance and educational opportunities, as well as joint spatial and socio-economic planning.
 Priority 3 (Horizontal priority) "people-to-people cooperation" aims at developing local initiatives to increase the administrative capacity of local and regional authorities.
 Website non available.
 - **Polonia-Bielorrusia-Ucrania**, 186,201 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Ministerio de Desarrollo Regional de Polonia
http://admin.interact-eu.net/downloads/1313/Interact_Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_Poland_Belarus_Ukraine_Programme_2013.pdf
 Priority 3 "Networking and people-to-people cooperation" includes regional and local cross-border cooperation capacity building, as well as local communities' initiatives.
 Muchas dificultades para que Bielorrusia pueda absorber los fondos ENPI. Programas modificados en el nuevo periodo 2014-2020.
 - **Hungría-Eslovaquia-Rumanía-Ucrania**, 68,638 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Agencia Nacional de Desarrollo de Hungría
http://admin.interact-eu.net/downloads/1312/Interact_Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_Hungary_Slovakia_Romania_Ukraine_Programme_2013.pdf
 Both priority 1 "Promoting economic and social development" and 2 "Enhance environmental quality" stress the need to face jointly the development, sustainability and attractiveness of the eligible regions.
<http://www.huskroua-cbc.net/>
 - **Rumanía-Ucrania-República de Moldavia**, 126,718 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Ministerio de Desarrollo Regional y Vivienda de Rumanía
http://admin.interact-eu.net/downloads/1311/Interact_Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_Romania_Ukraine_Republic_of_Moldova_Programme_2013.pdf
 Priority 1 "Towards a more competitive border economy", includes the improvement of productivity and competitiveness of the region's urban and rural areas by working across borders as well as cross-border initiatives in transport, border infrastructure and energy.
 Priority 2 "Environmental challenges and emergency preparedness" includes water and sewage management systems as well as environmental emergencies.
 Priority 3 "People-to-people cooperation" promotes greater interaction between people and communities living in border areas, including local and regional governance; support to civil society and local communities.
 Website non available.

Tabla A.5.5: **Programas ENPI CBC 2007-2013 en las fronteras marítimas:**

- **España-Marruecos**, 135,231 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda de España
Website non available. Programme not established.
- **CTF Atlántica**, 27,762 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Ministerior de Economía y Hacienda de España
Website non available. Programme not established.
- **Italia-Túnez**, 25,191 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Región de Silicia (IT)
http://admin.interact-eu.net/downloads/1309/Interact_Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_Italy_Tunisia_Programme_2009.pdf
Priority 1 "Regional development and integration" includes the support to institutional cooperation (regional organisations, chambers of commerce ...) for local development purposes.
<http://www.italietunisie.eu/>

Tabla A.5.6: **Programas ENPI CBC 2007-2013 en las cuencas marinas:**

- **Región del Mar Báltico** [BY, DE, DK, EE, FI, LV, LT, NO, PL, SE (RU)], 22,608 € (contribución de la IEVP al programa integral del Báltico), Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Banco de Inversiones de Schleswig-Holstein (DE)
http://admin.interact-eu.net/downloads/1308/Interact_Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_Baltic_Sea_Region_Programme_2013.pdf
Priority 1 "Generation and dissemination of innovations across the Baltic Sea Region" also includes selected non-technical innovations, and making special social groups of citizens better at generating and absorbing knowledge.
Priority 2 "improving the external and internal accessibility" highlights the promotion and preparation of joint transnational solutions in the field of transport ICT overcoming functional barriers.
Priority 3 "environmental pollution" stresses a broader framework of sustainable management of the sea resources.
Priority 4 "cooperation of metropolitan regions, cities and rural areas" enhances its attractiveness for citizens and investors, including the strengthening or urban-rural partnerships. The priority is also open to prepare pan-Baltic strategies, action programmes, policies and subsequent investments. A special feature under this priority is joint actions dedicated to the social sphere of regional and city development.
Eight EU Member States, Norway, and only two partner countries – Russia and the Republic of Belarus - participate. It is designed as an integrated programme that combines the ENPI's cross-border approach to the sea basin with the ERDF's Baltic Sea Region transnational cooperation programme.
- **Cuenca del Mar Negro** [AM, BG, GE, GR, MD, RO, TR, UA (AZ, RU)], 17,306 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Ministerio de Desarrollo Regional y Vivienda de Rumanía
http://enpi.interact-eu.net/downloads/1307/Interact_Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_Black_Sea_Basin_Programme_2013.pdf
Priority 1 "Supporting CB partnerships for economic and social development" includes the following measures:

- Strengthening accessibility and connectivity for new intra-regional information, communication, transport and trade links.
- Creation of tourism networks in order to promote joint tourism development initiatives and traditional products.
- Creation of administrative capacity for the design and implementation of local development policies.

Priority 2 "Sharing resources and competencies for environmental protection and conservation":

- Strengthening the joint knowledge and information base needed to address common challenges in the environmental protection of river and maritime systems.
- Promoting research, innovation and awareness in conservation and environmental protection for protected natural areas.
- Promotion of cooperation initiatives aimed at innovation in technologies and management of solid waste and wastewater management system.

Priority 3 "Supporting cultural and educational initiatives for the establishment of a common cultural environment in the Basin":

- Promoting cultural networking and educational exchange in the Black Sea Basin communities.

<http://blacksea-cbc.net/programme/>

It was not only funded from the ENPI and ERDF but also from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), to provide for Turkey's participation.

- **Cuenca del Mar Mediterráneo** [CY, DZ, EG, ES, FR, GR, IT, LY, MT, PT, TN, UK (MA, TR)], 173,607 M€, Autoridad de Gestión Conjunta: Región de Cerdeña (IT)

http://enpi.interact-eu.net/downloads/1306/Interact_Factsheet_ENPI_CBC_Mediterranean_Sea_Basin_Programme_2009.pdf

Priority 1 "Promotion of socio-economic development and enhancement of territories" stresses innovation, research, and the creation of economic clusters in local development.

Priority 4 "Promotion of cultural dialogue and local governance" includes the improvement of governance processes at local level.

A monitoring report already warned in 2009¹⁰ about the difficulties encountered in relation to Russia's signature of the financing agreements "which may prevent the start-up of five cooperation programmes in which Russia is the only partner country. Russia was already excluded from the Baltic Sea Region Programme and may not be able to take part in the Black Sea Programme". On the other hand, "difficulties between Spain and Morocco are hindering the preparation of the bilateral programmes. Some of the funds initially budgeted are already lost and there is a risk that all the funds allocated for the Atlantic and Spain-Morocco programmes will be forfeited. Moreover, that problem has forced Morocco to suspend its participation in the Mediterranean Sea Basin Programme. That, together with non-participation by Algeria, has greatly reduced the chances of cooperation in the Maghreb area."

¹⁰ European Parliament, DG Internal Policies, Policy Dep. B Structural and Cohesion Policies (2009) *Monitoring programmes of CBC with neighbouring partner countries*, Brussels, May 2009

IPA CBC (CTF IPA) 2007-2013

El **Instrumento para la Ayuda a la Pre-Adhesión** (IPA) es un instrumento financiero unificado de la UE que reunió en 2007 todo el apoyo a la pre-adhesión en un único instrumento, orientado a ayudar en el proceso de preparar a los países candidatos y precandidatos y su adhesión a la EU.

IPA contó con 11.500 millones de € durante el periodo 2007-2013. Su sucesor, IPA II, se construye sobre los resultados ya alcanzados destinando 11.700 millones de € para el periodo 2014-2020.

Los países beneficiarios son: Albania, Bosnia y Herzegovina, la ex República Yugoslava de Macedonia, Kosovo*, Montenegro, Serbia y Turquía.

Durante el periodo de programación 2007-2013 este apoyo tuvo cinco componentes:

- Ayuda a la Transición y Desarrollo Institucional
- Cooperación Transfronteriza
- Desarrollo Regional
- Desarrollo de Recursos Humanos
- Desarrollo Rural

Mientras otros componentes ofrecían apoyo en el interior de los países beneficiarios, el segundo componente, IPA-CBC (CTF-IPA en castellano), tenía un carácter más amplio. Se ofrecieron iniciativas transfronterizas dirigidas a la CTF entre estados miembros de la UE y los países candidatos y potenciales candidatos, así como entre los propios países beneficiarios IPA, e incluso podía financiar la participación de los países beneficiarios en programas de cooperación transnacional del FEDER.

Los programas de CTF IPA con los estados miembros se pueden ejecutar de dos formas: *gestión compartida* y *enfoque transitorio*. En la gestión compartida, las tareas de ejecución se delegan en una única Autoridad de Gestión, localizada en uno de los estados

miembros de la UE participantes, utilizando un único paquete de reglas en todo el territorio elegible. Cuando no se dan las condiciones para la gestión compartida, es posible un enfoque transitorio. En este caso, el programa se ejecuta mediante gestión compartida en el lado del estado miembro, mientras que en el lado del país beneficiario IPA, el programa se ejecuta de forma centralizada o descentralizada.

Programas CBC IPA en el periodo 2007-2013. Algunos de ellos aún están en ejecución (verano de 2015):

Tabla A.5.7 : **Programas Operativos de CTF del Instrumento de Ayuda para la Pre-Adhesión (CTF IPA) 2007-2013**

- **Adriático:**
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2007-2013/crossborder/adriatic-ipa-cross-border-co-operation-programme-2007-2013
- **Bulgaria-Serbia:**
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2007-2013/crossborder/bulgaria-serbia-ipa-cross-border-co-operation-programme-2007-2013
- **Bulgaria-FYROM:**
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2007-2013/crossborder/bulgaria-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-ipa-cross-border-co-operation-programme-2007-2013
- **Bulgaria-Turquía:**
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2007-2013/crossborder/bulgaria-turkey-ipa-cross-border-co-operation-programme-2007-2013
- **Grecia-FYROM:**
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2007-2013/crossborder/greece-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia-ipa-cross-border-co-operation-programme-2007-2013
- **Grecia-Albania:**
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2007-2013/crossborder/greece-albania-ipa-cross-border-co-operation-programme-2007-2013
- **Hungría-Croacia:**
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2007-2013/crossborder/hungary-croatia-ipa-cross-border-co-operation-programme-2007-2013
- **Hungría-Serbia:**
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2007-2013/crossborder/hungary-serbia-ipa-cross-border-co-operation-programme-2007-2013
- **Rumanía-Serbia:**
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2007-2013/crossborder/romania-serbia-ipa-cross-border-co-operation-programme-2007-2013
- **Eslovenia-Croacia:**
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2007-2013/crossborder/slovenia-croatia-ipa-cross-border-co-operation-programme-2007-2013

THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

A very accurate piece of information about the Eastern Partnership (EaP) can be found in Wikipedia, explaining this initiative of the EU for its relationship with the post-Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, to provide a venue for discussions on trade, economic strategy, travel agreements, and other issues between the EU and its eastern neighbours. It includes some elements of criticism that are worth to be read.

The architecture of the project was initiated by Poland in co-operation with Sweden. It was presented by their foreign ministers at the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels on 26th May 2008. It was discussed at the European Council on 19th and 20th June 2008, along with the ***Union for the Mediterranean***.

The Czech Republic endorsed the proposal completely, while Bulgaria and Romania were cautious, fearing that the ***Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue*** and the ***Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation*** could be undermined. Meanwhile, Germany, France, and others were not quite happy with the possibility that the Eastern Partnership could be seen as a stepping stone to membership (especially for Ukraine), while Poland and other Eastern states explicitly welcomed this effect.

The Eastern Partnership was inaugurated by the EU in Prague on 7th May 2009, when the Czech Republic invited the leaders of the six members of the initiative. Meanwhile, Germany attended the summit to signal their alarm at the economic situation in the East. There were some discussions between the EU and the Russian Federation highlighting the importance of this area for both. The first meeting of foreign ministers in this framework was held on 8th December 2009 in Brussels.

The Eastern Partnership complements the Northern Dimension (ND) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UM) as an institutionalised forum to discuss visa agreements, free trade deals, and strategic partnership agreements with the EU's eastern neighbours, while avoiding the controversial topic of accession to the EU.

The core policy of the Eastern Partnership is the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as well as the principles of market economy, sustainable development and good governance." The idea was to provide the foundation for new association agreements between the EU and those partners who have made sufficient progress towards the principles and values mentioned". Apart from values, the EU has declared the region to be of "strategic importance" and the EU has an "interest in developing an increasingly close relationship with its Eastern partners..."

The new generation of Association Agreements was negotiated with some countries on an individual basis. These replaced the *Partnership and Cooperation Agreements* concluded with partner countries (apart from Belarus) in the late 1990s. Many consider these agreements as merely symbolic; though the Eastern Partnership process envisages legal "approximation" and joint "institution building" leading to the creation of a new free-trade zone including the 28 EU States and the six partners. The policy would see visa-free travel to the EU for 76 million people — 46 million of them in Ukraine— living in the region. Steps toward "visa liberalisation" are to be taken on "a long-term perspective and on a case-by-case basis."

There are plans to model the concept on the [*Stabilisation and Association Process*](#) used by the EU in the [*Balkans*](#), including

a possible [free trade area](#) encompassing the countries in the region, similar to [BAFTA](#)¹¹ or [CEFTA](#)¹². A future membership perspective is not ruled out, either.

Regarding finances, the European Commission earmarked € 600 million for the six partner countries for the period 2010–2013 as part of the ENPI, about a quarter of the total funding for Eastern Partnership countries in that period. The funds were to be used for three main purposes¹³:

- **Comprehensive Institution Building** programmes, aimed at supporting reforms (approximately €175 million);
- **Pilot regional development** programmes, aimed at addressing regional economic and social disparities (approximately €75 million); and
- **Implementation of the Eastern Partnership**, focusing on democracy, governance and stability, economic integration and convergence with EU policies, energy security, and contacts between people with the aim of bringing the partners closer to the EU (approximately €350 million).

Unlike the Union for the Mediterranean, the Eastern Partnership does not have

its own secretariat, but it is controlled directly by the European Commission.

The Eastern Partnership and EU-Ukraine relations

Ukraine is one of six post-Soviet nations invited to co-operate with the EU within the multilateral framework that the Eastern partnership is expected to establish. However, Kiev pointed out that it remains pessimistic about the "added value" of this initiative. Indeed, Ukraine and the EU already started the negotiations on new, enhanced political and free-trade agreements (Association and Free-Trade Agreements) before the Russian-Ukrainian escalation.

Also, there was some progress in liberalising the visa regime despite persistent problems in the EU Member States' visa approach towards Ukrainians. Under the Eastern Partnership, Poland and Ukraine reached an agreement replacing visas with simplified permits for Ukrainians residing within 30 km of the border. Up to 1.5 million people may benefit from this agreement which took effect on 1 July 2009.

The approval of the political provisions of the Association Agreement with the EU in March 2014 is alleged to have provoked a revolution in Ukraine and the

¹¹ The Baltic Free Trade Area (BALTA) was a free trade agreement between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that existed between 1994 and 2004. BAFTA was created to help prepare the countries for their accession to the EU. Hence, BAFTA was created more as an initiative of the EU than out of a desire of Baltic States to trade between themselves: they were more interested in gaining access to the rest of the European markets. On 1st May 2004, all three states joined the EU, and BAFTA ceased to exist. BAFTA was part of general co-operation between the three countries, modelled on Nordic co-operation (Nordic Council). Leaders met regularly and, as well as a free trade area, they formed a common visa area and started military co-operation due to the proximity of Russia.

¹² The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) is a trade agreement between non-EU countries in Southeast Europe. As of 1st July 2013, the parties of the CEFTA agreement were

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on behalf of Kosovo. Former parties were Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Their CEFTA memberships ended when they became member states of the European Union (EU). The original CEFTA agreement was signed by the Visegrád Group countries, i.e. by Poland, Hungary and Czech and Slovak republics (at the time parts of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic) on 21st December 1992 in Kraków, Poland. It came into force in July 1994.

¹³ See the "Vademecum on Financing in the Frame of the Eastern Partnership", European External Action Service, last updated 24th September 2010:

http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/eap_vademecum_en.pdf

ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych, due to his refusal to sign the agreement. Russia, instead presented an association with customs union between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia as an alternative. The EU and the new Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed the economic part of the Association Agreement on 27th June 2014, and described this as Ukraine's "first but most decisive step" towards EU membership. On 12th September 2014, provisional application of Title IV and related Annexes and Protocols was postponed to 31st December 2015. Provisional application of Titles III, V, VI and VII and related Annexes and Protocols came into force as of 1st November 2014.

Now we know that there are different views of the Eastern Partnership in different parts of Ukraine, being very difficult to foresee what is going to happen in the near future. When preparing this report, the situation in Eastern Ukraine is unclear, as well as its effects in the relationship with the EU.

Relationship with Russia

Russia voiced concerns over the Eastern Partnership since the very beginning of the process, while the European Union stressed that "the Eastern Partnership is not about spheres of influence in the quest for oil". Russia also expressed concerns about too much pressure on Belarus due to their possible recognition of independence of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The case of Ukraine was very strategic in the process, installed in the dilemma of joining the EU or a "custom union" with Russia and other CIS countries. Then, in 2014-2015, the escalation of events in Eastern Ukraine makes very difficult to see the future evolution. How the current situation between Russia-Ukraine and the EU will affect the Eastern Partnership is a main question mark. The capacities of the European

External Action Service and the EU Member States face an enormous challenge at the very time of writing this paper.

This is a main challenge for the EEAS: the coordination of positions in a comprehensive approach towards such complicated situation. Russia is a sovereign and powerful state which should be a strategic partner of the EU for many reasons. A clear agreement on Ukraine should be established. And then, guarantees for current and potential cross-border programmes should be guaranteed, especially at the Russian-Ukrainian border, based on existing CBC structures (euroregions) and on the experience developed at the borders between the Russian Federation, the EU and Norway (e.g. Kolarctic or Barents Cooperation).

The Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum

The Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (CSF) is an integral part of the Eastern Partnership program and creates a significant and institutional platform for civil society organisations to monitor and discuss the developments regarding democracy building and human rights development in the six partnership countries. It consists of six national platforms and five thematic working groups. The CSF meets annually to discuss the latest developments and to set their working program. It has promoted the implementation of several major projects and it is campaigning for an EU response to the situation of Human Rights in Azerbaijan. It is also preparing to monitor the Association Agreements planned in the ENP between the EU and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

Some criticism from scratch

Although the Eastern Partnership was inaugurated on 7th May 2009, academic research critically analysing the policy became available by early 2010. Research findings from a UK ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) research project examining the EU's relations with three Eastern Partnership member states, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova noted both conceptual and empirical dilemmas. First, conceptually the EU has limited uniform awareness of what it is trying to promote in its eastern neighbourhood under the aegis of 'shared values', 'collective norms' and 'joint ownership'. Secondly, empirically, the EU seems to favour a 'top-down' governance approach (based on rule/norm transfer and conditionality) in its relations with outsiders, which is clearly at odds with a voluntary idea of 'partnership', explicitly limits the input of 'the other' in the process of reform and hamper their ownership and accountability. On the other hand, the promotion of a bottom-up approach may mobilize new energies, more connected with the citizens, their needs and values and, of course, including the valuable inputs of LRAs and civil society.

HOW DOES THE NEW EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD INSTRUMENT (ENI) LOOK LIKE FOR THE NEW PERIOD 2014-2020?

The European Parliament and the Council to the Multiannual Financial Framework package adopted a new ENI¹⁴ providing most of funding to the 16 partner countries of the ENP: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Republic of Moldova, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine, in line with the principles of differentiation and the

incentive-based approach. Building on the achievements of the previous European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the ENI supports the strengthening of relations with Neighbourhood countries. This support is provided through bilateral, multi-country and cross border co-operation (CBC) programmes.

In line with the renewed Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2011, the support through the ENI mainly focus on the following **priorities**:

- Promoting human rights and the rule of law; establishing deep and sustainable democracy and developing a thriving civil society;
- sustainable and inclusive growth and economic, social and territorial development; including progressive integration in the EU internal market;
- mobility and people-to-people contacts; including student exchanges and strengthening civil society;
- regional integration, including CBC.

Main elements of the new ENI/Differences from ENPI and operational implications:

- The **ENI budget** for the period 2014-2020 is € 15.433 billion, representing a comparable level to the previous ENP instrument. This is a significant decrease compared to the 2011 Commission proposal, but still a good outcome in the financial climate of November 2013, when the Multi-Annual Financial Framework of the EU for the period 2014-2020 was agreed. ENP countries also keep on benefiting from several other EU instruments.
- The programming and implementation of ENI support have to be aligned with the policy framework

¹⁴ Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11th March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood

Instrument, Official Journal of the European Union, L77/27, 15th March 2014

- (Communications, Council Conclusions, EP Resolutions, etc.).
- There is a growing **differentiation** between partners countries and an **incentive based approach**: the levels of support will be adjusted to every partner country needs and progress, based on clear criteria included in the regulation and regular assessment reports. Support will be increased for those genuinely implementing broad and comprehensive democratisation processes and other agreed reforms.
 - Specific **"more for more" mechanisms** have been introduced to support this approach:
 - i. bilateral baseline budgets will take account of progress as well as needs;
 - ii. the SPRING¹⁵ and EaPIC¹⁶ programmes have been extended as an umbrella programme worth 10% of the ENI budget; and
 - iii. programmed bilateral allocations will be paid in a range of no more than 20% and will be adjusted within that range reflecting countries' progress in building deep and sustainable democracy and in implementing agreed political, economic and social reforms.
 - **Streamlining the scope** of this Instrument by focussing on key objectives reflecting political priorities in the ENP Action Plans or equivalent documents.
 - A more streamlined programming document, the **Single Support Framework** is based on the analysis of priorities in every Action Plan and equivalent document. It aims to improve coherence and co-ordination between funding under the ENI and other EU instruments.
 - A strong effort in simplification of procedures, highlighting both the need and the scope to streamline, shorten and better focus the programming process.
 - There are linkages with internal agencies, instruments and policies. The ENP gives partners the option to participate in EU agencies and programmes.
 - **Russia** is redefined as a Strategic Partner and will no longer receive bilateral support under ENI. Nonetheless it will continue to receive support under multi-country programmes (regional and Cross-Border Co-operation) and Erasmus. However current scalation in Eastern Ukrainian provinces set a question mark in this partnership.
 - The ENI regulation sets out **indicative priorities and broad allocations** by type of programme in its Annex II.
 - The **European Parliament** (EP) now has a greater say in how the ENI is used. Notably, a political level Strategic Dialogue with the EP has been established to guide programming which includes the discussion of country level priorities and indicative budgets.

¹⁵ The SPRING Programme: *Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth*, was adopted on 27th September 2011 by the EU as a direct response to the events of the Arab Spring.

¹⁶ The EaPIC Programme: the *Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation* (EaPIC)

programme, adopted 26 June 2012, contributed further to an enhanced implementation of the Eastern Partnership.

Timetable for ENI and programming

<http://www.enpi-info.eu/ENI>

The Parliament approved the new ENI with more than €15 billion in funding for 2014-2020.

The new Heading 4 Regulations including ENI entered into force in March 2014. They apply from 1st January 2014 until 31st December 2020.

BASICS of the ENP

What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?

The ENP was developed in 2004 to avoid new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and, instead, strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all. It is based on the values of democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights.

This ENP framework was proposed to the 16 of EU's closest neighbours —Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine— and, more than an integrated approach, it is essentially a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country. It is complemented by more integrated regional and multilateral co-operation initiatives: the Eastern Partnership (launched in Prague in May 2009), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED) (formerly known as the Barcelona Process, re-launched in Paris in July 2008), and the Black Sea Synergy (launched in Kiev in February 2008).

Within the ENP the EU offers its neighbours a privileged relationship, a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The deepness of the relationship depends on the extent to which these values are shared. The ENP

includes political association and deeper economic integration, increased mobility and more people-to-people contacts.

It also offers to its partners a very concrete set of opportunities through sector policies: from employment and social policy, trade, industrial and competition policies to agriculture and rural development, climate change and environment. They include energy security, transport, research and innovation, as well as support to health, education, culture and youth.

In 2010-2011, the EU reviewed the ENP and put a strong focus on the promotion of deep and sustainable democracy, accompanied by inclusive economic development. Deep and sustainable democracy means in particular free and fair elections, freedom of expression, of assembly and of association, judicial independence, fight against corruption and democratic control over the armed forces. The EU also stressed the role of civil society bringing about deep and sustainable democracy. The EU unveiled a "more for more" principle, under which the EU would develop stronger partnerships with those neighbours that make more progress towards democratic reform.

The ENP remains distinct from the process of enlargement although, in accordance with Treaty provisions, it does not prejudge how the relationship of European neighbours with the EU may develop in future.

In 2011, total trade between the EU and its ENP partners was worth € 230 billion.

In 2007-2013, the EU provided partners with over € 12 billion in grant money for the implementation of the ENP.

The EU issued 3.2 million Schengen visas to ENP partners in 2012.

How does it work?

The bilateral **Action Plans** or **Association Agendas** between the EU and each ENP partner are the core of the ENP (12 of them have already been agreed to date). These set out an agenda of political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities of 3-5 years. ENP Action Plans/Association Agendas reflect each partner's needs and capacities, as well as their and the EU's interests. The ENP is not yet 'activated' for Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria, though an Action Plan with Algeria is under negotiation for a long time (2015).

Under the ENP, the EU works together with its partners to develop democratic, socially equitable and inclusive societies, and offers its neighbours economic integration, improved circulation of people across borders, financial assistance and technical cooperation towards approximation to EU standards.

Specific sector cooperation = Thematic Concentration

A better cooperation in specific sectors to improve living conditions of citizens in a tangible way, in order:

- ...to promote the respect for the basic principles of dignity and equality, human rights, and social and economic justice. These principles are embodied in democratic legal systems and the rule of law, and guaranteed by independent courts. Efficient and accessible courts protect citizens from arbitrariness, ensure respect for their fundamental rights and guarantee effective justice for all. Cooperation in reforming the judicial sector and in the fight against corruption forms one of the main priority areas of the ENP in partner countries.
- ...to link partner countries with the internal market of the EU and its social and economic model. For partners, this means adopting basic rules on equal opportunities, economic participation and fair competition, together with well-governed institutions and access to social services for all citizens. It also involves the promotion of environmental and consumer protection standards, food safety, healthy and safe working conditions. On this basis, the ENP also promotes the right conditions for economic growth and job creation.
- ...to connect the EU with its neighbours, promoting trade, building energy and transport networks, or fostering tourism. It builds bridges between people, facilitates mobility and fosters inter-cultural understanding. It pays particular attention to educational and youth exchanges, with the aim of fostering the development of talent and well-educated, strong and responsible societies.

Sector policy dialogue and cooperation are a basic element of the ENP and a concrete translation of the EU's foreign policy in the neighbourhood. By bringing the neighbours closer to its policies and standards, the EU promotes its core values of just, well-governed societies, promoting social development and economic opportunities to all their citizens.

Financial support, legal agreements and programming — Keywords:

“more-for-more” and concentration)

Support and agreements

The financial support of the European Commission is provided through grants to partners; the *European Investment Bank* and the *European Bank for Reconstruction and Development* complement this support through loans.

Civil society plays an important role in contributing to democracy and the building of good governance in partner countries. The EU supports organisations via the **Civil Society Facility**, a new instrument created in September 2011 to strengthen the capacity of civil society to promote and monitor reforms, and increase public accountability.

The ENP builds upon the legal agreements in place between the EU and the partner in question: **Partnership and Cooperation Agreements** (PCA) or **Association Agreements** (AA). Implementation of the ENP is jointly promoted and monitored through the Committees and sub-Committees established in the frame of these agreements. The European External Action Service and the European Commission publish each year **ENP Progress Reports**. The assessments and recommendations contained in the Progress Reports are the basis of EU policy towards each ENP partner under the “more for more” principle.

The ‘more for more’ principle applies to all incentives proposed by the EU: policy developments as well as to financial assistance (excluded humanitarian

assistance, refugee & external borders funds and support to civil society, which already have own funding). Partners determinedly embarking on political reforms should be offered, in addition to the incentives available to other partners, those that relate to the most ambitious elements of:

- market access: economic integration and development (DCFTAs¹⁷);
- mobility of people (mobility partnerships);
- a greater share of the EU financial support

In that context, the Commission decided to set up specific programmes both for the Eastern (EaPIC) neighbours in 2011 and the Southern (SPRING) in 2012 in order to allocate extra financial support only to those neighbours taking clear and concrete steps on political reforms. A new Civil Society Facility was also created in 2011.

How is the ENP financed?

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¹⁷ The **Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area** (DCFTA), a free trade area between the EU and Ukraine, expected to be established through the Ukraine–EU Association Agreement in 2016, with implications for Ukrainian participation at the *Eurasian Economic Commission's Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia*. The EU

has signed DCFTAs with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, is under negotiation with Morocco, and has proposed it to Tunisia, but some experts doubt whether it is an appropriate instrument for these countries: <http://www.borderlex.eu/enp-overhaul-dcftas-still-good-idea-michael-leigh-shares-views/>

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A new Civil Society Facility was also created in 2011.

The ENP is supported by substantial EU financial assistance. Under the **ENPI 2007-2013**, nearly € 12 billion was provided in grants.

The main types of support and lists of individual programmes and projects are listed in:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/nighbourhood/index_en.htm

In addition, Neighbourhood countries have benefited from a variety of other EU programmes.

For the period **2014-2020**, the ENPI has been followed by a new European Neighbourhood Instrument (**ENI**). With a budget of over € 15 billion, the ENI builds on and strengthen some of the key features of the ENPI, in particular the greater differentiation between countries based on progress with reforms and two new mechanisms to support an incentive based approach (often referred to as "more for more"). These are: an umbrella programme of 10% of the ENI budget to be allocated to better performing countries; and the ability to vary bilateral allocations up or down with a range.

Four types of programme are supported:

- Bilateral programmes for the Neighbourhood countries;
- Regional programmes for the East and the South;
- An ENP-wide programme mainly funding Erasmus for All and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility;

CBC programmes between Member States and Neighbourhood countries.

¹⁸ The **Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area** (DCFTA), a free trade area between the EU and Ukraine, expected to be established through the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement in 2016, with implications for Ukrainian participation at the *Eurasian Economic Commission's Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia*. The EU

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In addition to the ENI, Neighbourhood countries will continue to benefit from a range of **other EU instruments and programmes**. The most important of these are global or thematic programmes under the **Development Co-operation Instrument**, the **European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights**, the **Instrument for Stability** and interventions under the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP) and the **Common Security and Defence Policy** (CSDP).

Following a political agreement to the new set of EU external assistance regulations covering the 2014-2020 period in December 2013, the EEAS and the Commission worked quickly to get the regulations adopted and published in 2014. In the meantime, programming (i.e. strategic planning) to establish priorities and multi-annual budgets for the instruments were under way. The programming allowed Single Support Frameworks or the equivalent to be finalised for each country or programme. Individual programmes could then be agreed and committed. Examples of current programmes and how they have supported ENP objectives, as well as many more informations, are available at the **EU Neighbourhood Info Centre**:

<http://www.enpi-info.eu/index.php>

The following link **Financial Cooperation Reference Documents** includes an archive of current and older documents related to ENP financial assistance (legal framework and programming documents of the ENI 2014-2020 and the ENPI 2007-2013):
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/financing-the-enp/index_en.htm

ENI Programming

Programming is only required for the first years of the current period to allow adaptation of EU support to evolving situation in each country or region. In the spirit of differentiation, the timeframes of the programming documents differ and take into account the specificity of the country situation and/or programmes concerned.

The programming priorities were developed in close cooperation with the national authorities of partner countries concerned, civil society and other relevant stakeholders, and in coordination with EU Member States. Action plans and other jointly agreed documents are a key point of reference. They were also subject of a Strategic Dialogue on programming with the European Parliament.

Following the principle of aid effectiveness, programming documents present three priority sectors of concentration. Each of them contains sector-related capacity development and institution building activities, including technical cooperation to assist in the approximation to EU legislation and technical standards. Besides, a horizontal envelope allows a complementary support for capacity development and Civil Society.

The Benefits of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

The ENP shares EU knowledge and principles with neighbouring countries by means of strengthening stability, security and well-being for all partners, including EU citizens.

The ENP offers partner countries participation in various EU activities with the aim of increasing cooperation on political, security, economic and cultural matters.

The social and economic benefits of the ENP are considerable. The following thematic areas illustrate the scope of the cooperation between the EU and its partner countries through examples of projects launched through the ENP:

- Energy
- Health
- Small and Medium Enterprises
- Sanitary and Phytosanitary
- Public Finance Management
- Public Procurement
- Competition
- Customs
- Taxation
- Trade
- Agriculture / Geographical Indicators
- Consumer Protection
- Statistics
- Civil Protection
- Climate Change
- Environment
- Fish and Maritime
- Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
- Space
- Education, Youth, Culture
- Employment and Social
- Transport
- Information society
- Mobility / Justice and Home Affairs
- Research

(See a description of every area and a set of examples of good practices in:

http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/which-are-the-benefits/index_en.htm).

The ENP action plans (or Association Agendas for Eastern partner countries)...

- set out the partner country's agenda for political and economic reforms, with short and medium-term priorities of 3 to 5 years
- reflect the country's needs and capacities, as well as its and the EU's interests.

http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/action-plans/index_en.htm

ENI CBC 2014-2020

Programas de Cooperación Transfronteriza del Instrumento Europeo de Buena Vecindad (

El ENI tiene 16 países asociados: Argelia, Armenia, Azerbaijón, Bielorrusia, Egipto, Georgia, Israel, Jordania, Líbano, Libia, Moldavia, Marruecos, Palestina, Siria, Túnez y Ucrania.

Tabla A.5.8: Programas de CTF del ENI-CBC 2014-2020 en las Fronteras Terrestres:

The previous ENPI Lithuania-Poland-Russia has been splitted in two unsuccessful programmes (by now):

- **Lithuania-Russia.** Programme not signed, and not expected to be.
News about walls appear lately.
- **Poland-Russia.** Difficulties to sign the programme, not fulfilled deadline at the end of 2016. However, first call will be launched without signature.

The previous ENPI Estonia-Latvia-Russia Programme 2007-2013 has also been splitted in two: Estonia-Russian and Latvia-Russia, and both contracts have been signed.

- **Estonia-Russia:** the Agreement was signed on 29th December 2016.
<http://www.estoniarussia.eu/>
Pskov very active.
- **Latvia-Russia:** on 24 November 2016, this CBC Programme 2014-2020 held the official Launch event and Partner Search Forum in Daugavpils, Latvia.
<http://latruscbc.eu/>

Other programmes with Russia have successfully been signed as well:

- **Karelia-Russia:** Financing Agreement Signed on 29th December 2016 by the Commission, Finland and Russia
<http://www.kareliacbc.fi/>
- **South East Finland – Russia:** The Joint Operational Programme document (JOP) of the South-East Finland – Russia CBC 2014-2020 was already approved on 18 December 2015, by the European Commission.
<http://www.sefrcbc.fi/>
Click [here](#) to download the programme document.

And some programmes are running their way with ups and downs:

- **Kolarctic:** the Kolarctic CBC 2014 - 2020 Programme Document was approved by the European Commission in December 2015
<http://www.kolarcticenpi.info/en>
Click [here](#) to download the programme document.

The rest of programmes:

- **Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine:** <http://www.huskroua-cbc.net/>
Click [here](#) to download the JOP.
- **Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus:** <http://www.eni-cbc.eu/llb/en>
- **Poland-Belarus-Ukraine:** <http://www.pbu2020.eu/en>
- **Romania-Moldova,** ok
- **Romania-Ukraine**

Tabla A.5.9: **Programas de CTF del ENI-CBC 2014-2020 en las Fronteras Marítimas:**

- **Italy-Tunisia:**
<http://www.italietunisie.eu/>
- **Mid-Atlantic**, complex issue, including Morocco and Gibraltar. Difficult.

Tabla A.5.10: **Programas de CTF del ENI-CBC 2014-2020 en las Cuencas Marinas:**

- **Black Sea** Basin:
<http://www.blacksea-cbc.net/>
- **Mediterranean** Sea Basin:
<http://www.enpicbmed.eu/>

El instrumento TESIM

Establecido para apoyar a los programas del ENI-CBC 2014-2020.




Fig. A.5.2: Territorios elegibles en los Programas de CTF del Instrumento Europeo de Buena Vecindad (ENI CBC) 2014-2020 (Fuente: TESIM-ENI CBC, Unión Europea, 2016)

TESIM: instrument to support ENI CBC programmes 2014-2020:

<http://tesim-enicbc.eu/>

THE KOLARCTIC ENPI CBC PROGRAMME

Kolarctic ENPI CBC is a financing instrument for cross-border projects in the Cap of the North and Northwest Russia. Something that, in other words, will function as a flexible tool for public and private organisations that are willing to implement development projects across the borders between Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden. The range of the projects and project organisers is large, which makes it possible to create and maintain cross-border partnerships, exchange ideas and develop them in a broader context between sectors. The programme has been assessed by experts and agreed upon by consensus between politicians and officials from the various regions and participating countries. The programme has created new partnerships, both at regional and national levels, which has resulted in a better exchange of knowledge and expertise. It has also created new ideas, working methods and networks, which in turn helps to create stability in the Barents Region.

The programme has resulted in better cultural understanding, and tolerance for different lifestyles and ways of working together. Examples of valuable

results are that young people participating in the project have opened their eyes and realised that young people across borders are just like them. The languages are different, but with the motivation to understand and communicate with their neighbours anything is possible. The purpose of cross-border partnerships between regions and countries is to enhance and maintain the social, economic and environmental well-being of the area. When people learn about other people's way of life, exchange experiences, plan the future together and carry out joint projects, they create goals that they can work on together. When we learn about other cultures, we also learn about our own identity, and that also makes the region rich and varied.

FRANZ JOSEF LAND



Fig. A.5.3: Advertisement about the Kolarctic Programme in:



FIFTYONE: Produced by Kolarctic ENPI CBC programme in cooperation with Yours communication, Luleå Sweden.
TEXT: Written by Maija Myllylä and Vanessa Cicero, Yours. **COVER PHOTO:** Connecting Young Barents
PRINT: Luleå grafiska AB, October 2015.

IPA CBC 2014-2020

A draft proposal for a regulation of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for the period 2014-2020 (**IPA II**) addressed to Iceland, the Western Balkans and Turkey was developed in 2013-2014. In the Western Balkans the European Council has granted the status of candidate country to Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia. It has also confirmed the European perspective for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Kosovo, which are considered potential candidates.

It proposes a simplification of procedures in order to facilitate EU assistance to beneficiary countries and regions, civil society organisations, SMEs, etc. It also includes many references that can be used by LRAs to take more active part in the different programmes. It is important to follow up the elaboration and implementation of the "Strategy Papers" between every participating country and the EU. These programmes can be combined with other, like ENI ones.

IPA II builds on the results already achieved by IPA I through the allocation of € 11.7 billion for the period 2014-2020. Current beneficiaries are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo*, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. Only Turkey and FYROM are eligible for the five componentes, while potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo¹⁹) are eligible only for the first two components. IPA II sets a new framework for providing pre-accession assistance for the period 2014-2020 and it has been prepared in partnership with the beneficiaries.

A strategic focus is the most important innovation of IPA II. **Country Strategy**

Papers are the specific strategic planning documents for each beneficiary for the 7-year period. These provide for a stronger ownership by the beneficiaries through integrating their own reform and development agendas. A **Multi-Country Strategy Paper** addresses priorities for regional or territorial cooperation. Indicative Strategy Papers can be downloaded in the following link:

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/news_corner/key_documents/index_en.htm?key_document=080126248ca659ce

IPA II is also concerned by thematic concentration. It targets reforms within pre-defined sectors covering areas closely linked to the enlargement strategy, such as democracy and governance, rule of law or growth and competitiveness. This approach promotes structural reform of a given sector, brings it up to EU standards, and allows more targeted assistance, ensuring efficiency, sustainability and focus on results. It also allows for a more systematic use of sector budget support. It also takes more into account the measurement of performance: indicators agreed with the beneficiaries can help assess to what extent the expected results have been achieved.

The IPA II regulation came into force on 16 March 2014 and is applicable retroactively from 1st January 2014. It is complemented by the **Common Implementing Regulation** (CIR), a set of simplified and harmonised rules and procedures for all external action instruments, as well as the IPA II Implementing Regulation. Choose translations of the previous link adopted by the Commission on 2nd May 2014.

¹⁹ under UN Security Council Resolution 1244/99

Tabla A.5.11: **Programas de CTF del Instrumento para la Ayuda a la Preadhesión (IPA-CBC) 2014-2020**

- IPA CBC **Bulgaria – Serbia**:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/bulgaria/2014tc16i5cb007
<http://www.ipacbc-bgrs.eu/>
- IPA CBC **Bulgaria – Turkey**:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/bulgaria/2014tc16i5cb005
<http://www.ipacbc-bgtr.eu/>
- IPA CBC **Bulgaria – The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/bulgaria/2014tc16i5cb006
<http://www.ipa-cbc-007.eu/>
- IPA CBC **Croatia – Serbia**:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/croatia/2014tc16i5cb003
<http://www.interreg-croatia-serbia2014-2020.eu/>
- IPA CBC **Croatia – Bosnia and Herzegovina – Montenegro**:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/croatia/2014tc16i5cb004
<http://www.interreg-hr-ba-me2014-2020.eu/>
- IPA CBC **Greece – Albania**:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/greece/2014tc16i5cb010
<http://www.greece-albania.eu/>
- IPA CBC **Greece – The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/greece/2014tc16i5cb009
<http://www.ipa-cbc-programme.eu/>
- IPA CBC **Hungary – Serbia**:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/hungary/2014tc16i5cb001
<http://www.interreg-ipa-husrb.com/>
- IPA CBC **Italy – Albania – Montenegro**:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/italy/2014tc16i5cb008
<http://www.europuglia.it/index.php/cte-2014-2020/ipa-ii-cbc-it-al-me>
- IPA CBC **Romania – Serbia**:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/romania/2014tc16i5cb002
<http://www.romania-serbia.net/>
- **Cyprus-Turkey**: not set up yet.
- **Greece-Turkey**: not set up yet.

THE ROLE OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES (LRAs) IN THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

The participation of LRAs has been promoted very much within the ENP, particularly in Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) and other territorial cooperation programmes. Nevertheless most relevant activities are usually implemented by national authorities (top-down approach). Until now there has not been a clear place-based approach in these territories with functioning structures like those developed in the EU during the last twenty years. But there are evidences of a growing political will to develop, strengthen and support decentralized cooperation. There is no doubt that LRAs, as well as NGOs, are playing a growing role in many fields. National governments are also focusing and strengthening this role, even in countries where the sub-national level is underdeveloped or practically irrelevant. They have acknowledged the importance of involving LRAs to promote good governance, especially in border territories, but real implementation of their participation is difficult due to the lack of financial means and technical capacity. The latter is being improved lately and this will pressurize national agendas from the bottom. As a consequence, the participation of the sub-national level should become a main factor for the development of these areas in the new programming period.

The participation of local authorities is becoming more important and they could play a crucial role to involve all sectors of society in development and, in the case of border regions, to be aware of their proximity to the neighbouring country. Therefore, cultural, historical, economic, and social aspects of mutual interest are

acknowledged and valued as maximising element for their successful development. This needs to be perceived by stakeholders as an own process (developing accountability through empowerment²⁰).

Current situation and perspectives

Up to now there is no targeted staff training enough for this type of programmes addressed to LRAs. It would be ideal to build these capacities, so that LRAs could develop common programmes or strategies, organise permanent collaboration, and establish institutions/structures for cooperation and, in this way, create necessary added value for their citizens. With a view to targeted training, we will use the example of CBC to identify a series of challenges to be addressed:

- to avoid the terms “administration level” and “competences” for a cross-border structure. It is only about “practicable instruments” to cooperate and the “execution of necessary cross-border tasks”;
- not to compare structures, competences, legislation, etc., on both sides of a border (they will never be or become comparable);
- to overcome the lack of expertise and skills of the LRAs and relevant organisations in the field of CBC;
- to build up communication and exchange mechanisms based on a system of trust and to contribute to change people’s attitudes, perceptions and approaches;
- to encourage a bottom-up approach in regional/local development (in close partnership with the respective national authorities), involving all key actors and taking into account the targeted regional specific

²⁰ This document was prepared for a Platforma training session for LRAs in May 2014 in Tiflis (Georgia)

conditions (geographic, economic, social, cultural and political);

- to build up trust as the main element for future successful CBC.

On the other hand, in Western Europe it turned out that the regional/local level is the most suitable to implement CBC (in partnership with the national authorities on both sides of a border, and the EU), because:

- the actors on site are the most familiar with the cultural, social, geographical, economic and political conditions, as well as with obstacles and problems for cooperation;
- they do not only know about barriers and problems, but are also able to offer very practical solutions;
- they have the strongest interest in successful CBC, as their daily life is concerned;
- they are more interested in practical cooperation based on partnership than in clarification of questions of competence (always on table when the national level is involved);
- step-by-step development of CBC (first the tasks, then the structure).

Successful cooperation will depend on functional partnership. And, partnership within a decentralised structure for CBC would require:

- External partnership with the national governments on both sides of the border, because of political, strategic and financial reasons. National plans/programmes have to be taken into account. Political and financial support is needed.
- Internal partnership in order to involve all actors within a cross-border area (economic, social, cultural actors, public authorities and equivalent bodies, NGOs) to mobilise already available knowledge at national level for CBC.

Handling partnership in this way will avoid any conflict of competences and will not build up new bureaucratic structures. Here, it is important to

mention that the definition of a cross-border area is not purely depending on administrative and geographical factors. In Western Europe most partners cooperate because they have identified joint interests/concerns, common issues and problems.

Some recommendations for LRAs

Regional networks and local and regional partners in Western Europe have already recommended very strongly that LRAs should take part in the processes to determine the programmes. These processes have happened in 2014 both in the EU, at the external borders, and within the Neighbourhood countries. It is very important for LRAs to take direct or indirect part in these processes. LRAs should get involved from scratch, from the definition of concepts, strategies and indicators to the design of the implementation processes and evaluation procedures.

Taking again the example of decentralised cross-border cooperation (CBC), practising it at regional/local level in partnership with national governments and supra-national or inter-governmental organisations is the most suitable instrument to pave the way for a new quality of borders as meeting places offering a wide range of opportunities. At the same time there is a chance to transform the national peripheral situation of border areas in many countries into a more favourable internal position within the continent. CBC is not about abolishing borders, but reducing them to administrative limits like those between provinces and departments.

This requires the following framework conditions and steps:

- Political will of all states concerned.
- Bottom-up approach, where regional/local actors play the main role in partnership with the national

government (external partnership, avoiding conflicts of competences).

- Involvement of politicians at all levels from both sides of the border to build up lobby in favour of CBC.
- Hands-on participation of all actors in both sides of the border (public, private and public-equivalent bodies, NGOs, universities, etc.) in order to create a solid basis for CBC by using already existing knowledge on both sides of the border (internal partnership, avoiding conflicts of competences).
- Awareness that socio-cultural cooperation is as important as economic cooperation (and often a precondition for successful CBC as a whole).
- In the starting phase, informal cooperation based on private law.
- At the end, creation of permanent cross-border structures based on public law²¹.

It is recommended to use the following instruments:

- permanent advisory support and training;
- exchange of experiences on best practices and information;
- workshops/seminars, including targeted training;
- international conferences.

Permanent advisory support and training should be taken very much into account and has to be secured by a team of experts with European-wide practical and strategic expertise in cooperation (drafting and implementing joint programmes and projects, legal aspects and structures, evaluation) together with local experts. Without this practical and

European-wide experience the aim "to help actors at regional/local level to help themselves" cannot be achieved and consultants will remain the main actors in the field.

For cross-border programmes, but also valid for any other programme with a permanence aim, a multi-annual approach is needed as well. The experience in Western Europe shows that, in the "old" EU, CBC developed quite fast with targeted training by qualified experts over more than one decade. Under the regulation of PHARE-CBC and TACIS-CBC programmes in the new member states and third countries, the period for training and advice lasted only a few months, while the need for support was much stronger. And many different experts with strong varying ideas for CBC have been involved. As a result advice and training were not consistent, stopped after one year at most, and were not completed. People on the ground contributed with some new expertise, but also very different practices, and were always expecting a new contract. Most of them finally left to other jobs where they could capitalise their knowledge. And, when advice and training started up again after the break, they had to be implemented from zero.

Besides, with sound capacity building at regional/local level and a more sustainable and strategic CBC the following practical results can be achieved step by step:

- stronger bottom-up approach;
- better distribution of tasks and responsibilities;
- genuine cross-border programmes and projects;
- solutions for daily border problems;
- solutions for social problems;

²¹ Euroregions or similar structures, founded under the Madrid Outline Convention (Council of Europe, 1980), European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs) at the internal and external borders of the EU, or Euroregional Groupings of

Cooperation (EGC), created under the Third Additional Protocol to the Madrid Outline Convention.

- improving CBC of SMEs;
- development of new CBC between manufacturers and suppliers;
- intensified cooperation in sectors like health, environment, innovation and research, and tourism;
- improved cooperation in education, especially bilingual schools;
- stronger role of universities through cooperation in targeted analyses and studies (cross-border infrastructure, environment, diversification of economy, service sector, development of city centres, spatial planning);
- creation of a network for a cross-border labour market through cooperation between workers, trade unions and public authorities;
- promotion of cross-border vocational training and the mutual acknowledgement of national qualifications;
- creation of cross-border commercial sites;
- long-term cross-border development plans taken into account in national programmes;
- CBC between police, customs and border police departments.

ENI and IPA II open many new possibilities through main actions included in the agreements, but there are also instruments for smaller actions such as:

- **TAIEX**, the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument of the European Commission to support public administrations with regard to the approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation as well as facilitating the sharing of EU best practices. Eligible actions are workshops, expert missions and study visits:

<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/tenders/taix/>.

- **TWINNING**, originally designed to help candidate countries acquire the necessary skills and experience to adopt, implement and enforce EU legislation, since 2004 is also available to some of the eastern and southern Neighbourhood partner countries.
- **SIGMA** (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management), a joint European Commission and OECD initiative to strengthen public management:
<http://www.sigmaweb.org/about/>

In general, there is plenty of information available at the EU Info Points, in Internet, through national and international associations of local and regional authorities, and through initiatives such as Platforma, the European voice of LRAs to promote development and decentralized cooperation²².

²² This document was also prepared by the AEBR for a Platforma training session for LRAs in May 2014 in Tiflis (Georgia)

ASPECTOS ESPECÍFICOS DE INTERÉS PARA LAS FRONTERAS EXTERIORES DE LA UE Y MÁS ALLÁ

En julio de 2004, la ARFE hizo públicas sus recomendaciones sobre

Seguridad y Cooperación en las futuras fronteras exteriores de la UE, teniendo en cuenta el Tratado de Schengen

(disponible únicamente en inglés).

1. Security issues at the EU's future (current) external borders. Europe's citizens and politicians are unwilling to compromise on security at the EU's external borders, just as they were when the EU's internal borders were opened up and are today (then) with respect to CBC at the Union's current external borders. However, at the same time the intention—in spite of Schengen regulations— was to continue underpinning the cooperation between local communities and businesses that was set up and has now taken root at these borders after so many years of difficult relations. This can be done if we draw on the experience accumulated by border and cross-border regions in overcoming old internal European borders and cooperating at today's external borders.

2. Checkpoints. Checkpoints should, as a matter of principle, be accommodated in a single, shared building.

Justification: Not only does this save on costs (being cheaper than having, say, two separate national checkpoints), but more importantly enables intensive cooperation between border guards, the police and customs officials, for any problems arising can be tackled directly on both sides of the border and resolved by acting in unison. This is virtually

impossible to achieve when checkpoints are several hundred metres apart.

Practical experience with these proposals: Not that long ago, before the completion of the internal market, there were similar problems to be solved at the present EU's old internal borders. But we can also draw on the positive experiences at today's external EU borders:

Anywhere where joint customs clearance facilities were set up or gradually came to exist over a period of many years, the results included:

- more efficiently coordinated duty rosters;
- less problematic exports and imports of goods (e.g. joint veterinary inspections and so on);
- practical solutions to passport and visa problems;
- the easing of minor frontier traffic;
- joint patrols;
- improved security, ensured by fewer staff and a leaner administration;
- enhanced language skills on both sides of the border, greater understanding for the different respective administrative systems and procedures, and faster clearance times;
- border guards, police officers and customs officials in neighbouring, non-EU countries trained to a European standard.

Main reasons for having separate customs clearance facilities in the past:

National Planning and funding and subsidies provided by various EU programmes (European regional funds, PHARE, TACIS, CARDS or MEDA, with each respective Directorate-General reaching its own decision on how to finance such institutions), mean that there are hardly any joint investment plans.

3. Acceleration of clearance procedures at check points with border crossing. *Proposal:* a separate lane should either be constructed or opened for the border inhabitants (to be identified e.g. by special badges on the cars).

4. Visa procedures at future external borders. The need for visas is not being called into question.

The main issue here is the development of practical procedures for issuing visas to local citizens and businesses in border regions along the EU's new external borders. These procedures must pave the way for the flexible allocation of visas without any decrease in security or any constraints on necessary checks. One major drawback for people living close to a border is the fact that visas are often issued in capitals or major cities (most of which are not located in border regions), for this prevents them from making essential trips at short notice.

Consequently, local solutions have to be found for the population and businesses in the border regions, taking account of the main rules governing visa issuance.

Proposals:

Especially for businesses and the local population in border regions on both sides of the EU's new external borders:

- Issuance of visas valid for one year or at least for several months for people who can demonstrate professional or private reasons necessitating regular border crossings;
- issuance of multiple visas (e.g. valid for 10 or 15 border crossings) in accordance with professional or private requirements (if appropriate with the visa's validity limited to a certain period (e.g. 6 or 12 months).
- issuance of one-day visas if need be.
- Main prerequisites for these kinds of visa, if they are to be of real practical use:

- The establishment of offices issuing visas very close to the border or at official border crossings. There was an arrangement along these lines within the EU back in the 1970s and 1980s, and then in the 1990s at the EU's external borders. It should also be a practical proposition, provided that the staff in question are correspondingly trained and modern data readers are used.

Visa charges: Any such charges should remain customer-friendly and moderate, especially for businesses and the local populations in border areas, rather than being viewed primarily as a source of income for the State and therefore appearing prohibitive.

5. Entry possibilities for groups, schoolchildren, sports clubs, music ensembles and so forth. *Proposal:* Issuance of a group visa based on submitted, pre-checked lists, especially when entry and exit will take place within a specific, verifiable period (e.g. for a school trip, a sporting event, a musical happening in the neighbouring country, etc.) A lump-sum price would be charged for such a list-based visa.

Essential prerequisites: Visa issuance in places close to the border or directly at customs clearance facilities. This can be done without any problems provided that staff are properly trained and have modern data readers at their disposal.

6. Tourists. At the new external borders extensive European and national funds are being pumped into promoting tourism. However, this will only make sense if one crucial element of tourism in border areas is enabled, i.e. visits to the neighbouring country, without this entailing too much expense or administrative effort.

Proposals: Issuance of tourist visas for holidays or day trips. However, this only makes sense if visa applications do not have to be submitted in the respective capital city, and are instead issued locally, close to the border if need be (e.g. at border crossings). This can be

done if the staff in question are properly trained and have modern data readers at their disposal.

7. Additional border crossings for people living on both sides of the border.

In addition to the major, official border crossings, in the medium term cooperation between border guards, police and customs officials at regional and/or local level can be used as a basis for identifying border crossings that are suitable for use by local residents and tourists without any loss of security (hikers, cyclists, visits paid by neighbouring villages for musical events, and so forth).

Justification: Any border official can ascertain without much difficulty at such 'sensitive' border crossings, which are under surveillance anyway, whether persons approaching and attempting to cross the border are smugglers, refugees or harmless locals and tourists.

Locals or tourists should be able to cross the border at such points between

sunrise and sunset, for example, provided that they are in possession of a valid passport (if need be with the requisite visa) and are not carrying any smuggled goods. So the aim is solely to ensure that these regularly monitored border crossings can be used by locals and tourists alike, without making them liable to persecution. In many instances these border crossings are either located along the shortest route between neighbouring communities and events or prove highly attractive to tourists.

Likewise, any existing minor roads that cross borders and are not yet open to traffic should be opened up for use by locals and tourists (cars, bicycles), and especially for shopping, paying visits to the neighbouring country, attending certain events, and so on. Border crossings of this kind are normally monitored anyway, so normal citizens and tourists (with passports and not smuggling anything) should be able to use them without any negative consequences.




Fig. A.5.4 (A.1.7): Mapa de las Áreas y Estructuras de Cooperación Transfronteriza en Europa en 2011 (elaboración propia a partir de versiones anteriores del mapa; actualización permanente en las oficinas de la ARFE en Gronau)

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